The principal issues in this dispute over calculating health care-liability damages are (1) whether the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its mandate on remand; (2) whether post-judgment interest accrues from the first trial-court judgment or from the judgment on remand; and (3) whether the trial court properly vacated its first judgment when the Supreme Court remanded without instructions to vacate. In a first appeal in this case, in which Dr. Phillips contended the trial court erred by not capping, the Supreme Court remanded, holding that damages awarded against Dr. Phillips should have been capped consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand the trial court entered a second judgment, capping damages and awarding post-judgment interest beginning with the second judgment's date. When Bramlett appealed, the appeals court rejected Phillips' dismissal motion – based on his contention that the Supreme Court retained exclusive jurisdiction – and reversed to calculate interest from the first judgment.

The principal issue in this defamation case involving two Texas Tech medical professors is whether one's statements that the other “deals in half truths, which legally is the same as a lie” and has a “reputation for lack of veracity” constitute defamation by itself. Those statements, by Dr. Hancock, were in a resignation letter to the medical school dean complaining about Dr. Variyam, his supervisor and then the gastroenterology division chair. Hancock was responding to a letter Variyam wrote him, criticizing his patient care. Jurors rejected Hancock's truth defense and awarded Variyam damages after the trial court directed a verdict that Hancock's letter to the dean was libelous per se.

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Eva Guzman, Justice Debra Lehrmann

09-0828 Genesis Tax Loan Services Inc., et al. v. Kody and Janet Kothmann from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioners: G. Roland Love, Dallas For respondents: Mont McClendon, Lubbock The issues in this case between competing liens is (1) whether the appeals court erred by holding that Genesis, which claims a tax-lien transfer on four properties, was required to plead its lien superiority as an affirmative defense and (2) whether the appeals court misconstrued Texas Tax Code section 32.06 by holding that Genesis failed to effect transfer of the tax liens. The Kothmanns sold four properties on an installment plan and filed deeds of trust against the properties. Two years later the buyer borrowed money from Genesis Tax Loan Services to pay taxes on the properties and Genesis secured the loan with tax-lien transfers. When the borrower defaulted, Genesis tried to foreclose. The Kothmanns then sued Genesis, arguing that their liens were superior because they filed theirs first, Genesis did not plead its tax-lien transfers in defense and did not comply with requirements to effect the transfers. The trial court declared Genesis’ liens were superior, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that Genesis had to plead its liens were superior as a defense and that the liens did not comply with statutory requirements. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Eva Guzman, Justice Harriet O'Neill

08-0941 The Travelers Insurance Co. v. Barry Joachim from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Christopher B. Slayton, Lubbock For respondent: Stace Williams, Lubbock The issue is whether, after a nonsuit, the trial court’s order dismissing a case with prejudice for failing to prosecute it is a final-merits determination that bars a later suit. In this case Travelers sought to dismiss Joachim’s second suit against it because the trial court in the first suit dismissed that one in an order barring refiling. Travelers argues that dismissal of the first suit with prejudice, though otherwise improper, became a decisions on the merits when Joachim failed to challenge it. Instead of challenging the order in the first suit, Joachim filed an identical claim in a second court. After the trial court initially denied Travelers’ summary-judgment motion, based on res judicata, another judge on reconsideration granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that dismissal of a case for want of prosecution was not a merits determination and could not be ordered with prejudice. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Scott A. Brister, Justice Harriet O'Neill

07-0522 Benny P. Phillips, M.D. v. Dale Bramlett from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Jim Hund, Lubbock For respondents: John Smithee, Amarillo The Supreme Court will hear arguments of whether Stowers doctrine applies to avoid statutory damages cap in med-mal award. The principal issue is whether medical-malpractice damages are capped under the Medical Liability Insurance Improvement Act when the doctor’s liability insurer may be liable on a bad-faith claim. In this case the trial court ruled that the insurance company’s refusal to settle the case brought it under an exception to the statutory damages limit. Phillips also contends that the plaintiff’s jury argument – that they should send a message and “buck the liberal treatment” of doctors by previous med-mal juries – was incurable. In his lawsuit Bramlett claimed his wife died after a hysterectomy because her surgeon did not check on her before leaving the hospital and did not check his voice mail to learn early enough that she suffered from internal bleeding after her operation. Phillips argues that the jury’s multi-million verdict should have been capped by the medical-malpractice statute because the exception to those limits for an insurer that imprudently rejects a settlement offer – the basis of the Stowers doctrine – would not apply because the judgment was against the doctor, not the insurance company. Even if it does apply to the insurer, he contends, Bramlett did not prove the insurer refused an offer an “ordinary prudent insurer” should have accepted. The trial court refused to cap the damages and the court of appeals affirmed.