The principal issues in this dispute over calculating health care-liability damages are (1) whether the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its mandate on remand; (2) whether post-judgment interest accrues from the first trial-court judgment or from the judgment on remand; and (3) whether the trial court properly vacated its first judgment when the Supreme Court remanded without instructions to vacate. In a first appeal in this case, in which Dr. Phillips contended the trial court erred by not capping, the Supreme Court remanded, holding that damages awarded against Dr. Phillips should have been capped consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand the trial court entered a second judgment, capping damages and awarding post-judgment interest beginning with the second judgment's date. When Bramlett appealed, the appeals court rejected Phillips' dismissal motion – based on his contention that the Supreme Court retained exclusive jurisdiction – and reversed to calculate interest from the first judgment.

The principal issue in this defamation case involving two Texas Tech medical professors is whether one's statements that the other “deals in half truths, which legally is the same as a lie” and has a “reputation for lack of veracity” constitute defamation by itself. Those statements, by Dr. Hancock, were in a resignation letter to the medical school dean complaining about Dr. Variyam, his supervisor and then the gastroenterology division chair. Hancock was responding to a letter Variyam wrote him, criticizing his patient care. Jurors rejected Hancock's truth defense and awarded Variyam damages after the trial court directed a verdict that Hancock's letter to the dean was libelous per se.

The issue is whether named plaintiffs adequately represent a proposed landowners class in a riverbed-boundary dispute with the state General Land Office when the class would include landowners who settled with the state over the boundary and mineral rights resulting from it. A subsidiary question is whether the state, by its agreement with landowners after the class suit was filed, created a conflict with named plaintiffs. In this case the named plaintiffs, landowners along the Canadian River eastward from Lake Meredith in the Texas Panhandle, lost their effort to certify a class alleging the state took mineral rights when it established new river boundaries for the Canadian below the dam that created the lake. The state argues that the named plaintiffs do not adequately represent the putative class because many landowners along the river in the putative class settled with the state on their mineral rights based on a 1981 survey that fixed the river’s streambed width. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's class-certification denial.

In this health care-liability claim, a principal issue is whether a chiropractor’s expert testimony was improper to establish the duty to inform. Felton sued after he suffered a stroke as Dr. Lovett manipulated Felton’s neck to relieve pain. Doctors determined the stroke resulted from a tear in a spinal artery. A jury found for Lovett on Felton’s negligence claim, but for Felton on his second claim, that Lovett failed to inform him of the risk posed by the neck manipulation. The court of appeals reversed, noting Felton’s expert, a chiropractor, testified that neck manipulations were risky only if a problem exists with the spinal artery or if the adjustment were performed improperly. In this appeal Felton argues that the appeals court relied on the chiropractor’s opinion as it addressed causation, which he was not qualified by statute to give.

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Eva Guzman, Justice Debra Lehrmann

09-0828 Genesis Tax Loan Services Inc., et al. v. Kody and Janet Kothmann from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioners: G. Roland Love, Dallas For respondents: Mont McClendon, Lubbock The issues in this case between competing liens is (1) whether the appeals court erred by holding that Genesis, which claims a tax-lien transfer on four properties, was required to plead its lien superiority as an affirmative defense and (2) whether the appeals court misconstrued Texas Tax Code section 32.06 by holding that Genesis failed to effect transfer of the tax liens. The Kothmanns sold four properties on an installment plan and filed deeds of trust against the properties. Two years later the buyer borrowed money from Genesis Tax Loan Services to pay taxes on the properties and Genesis secured the loan with tax-lien transfers. When the borrower defaulted, Genesis tried to foreclose. The Kothmanns then sued Genesis, arguing that their liens were superior because they filed theirs first, Genesis did not plead its tax-lien transfers in defense and did not comply with requirements to effect the transfers. The trial court declared Genesis’ liens were superior, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that Genesis had to plead its liens were superior as a defense and that the liens did not comply with statutory requirements. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Eva Guzman, Justice Harriet O'Neill

08-0941 The Travelers Insurance Co. v. Barry Joachim from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Christopher B. Slayton, Lubbock For respondent: Stace Williams, Lubbock The issue is whether, after a nonsuit, the trial court’s order dismissing a case with prejudice for failing to prosecute it is a final-merits determination that bars a later suit. In this case Travelers sought to dismiss Joachim’s second suit against it because the trial court in the first suit dismissed that one in an order barring refiling. Travelers argues that dismissal of the first suit with prejudice, though otherwise improper, became a decisions on the merits when Joachim failed to challenge it. Instead of challenging the order in the first suit, Joachim filed an identical claim in a second court. After the trial court initially denied Travelers’ summary-judgment motion, based on res judicata, another judge on reconsideration granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that dismissal of a case for want of prosecution was not a merits determination and could not be ordered with prejudice. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Eva Guzman, Justice Harriet O'Neill

07-0945 Texas Parks and Wildlife Department v. The Sawyer Trust from Donley County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Kristofer S. Monson, Austin For respondent: Jody Sheets, Dallas This dispute over a mining permit to take sand and gravel from what the state contends is a navigational stream bed raises these principal issues: (1) whether the state’s jurisdictional immunity plea fails because the trust alleges the state is unconstitutionally “taking” its property and, if not, (2) whether state officials must be sued instead of the state itself. In this case the trust seeks to sell sand and gravel from the bed of the Salt Fork of the Red River traversing its property. By statute the state, through the parks department, owns sand and gravel in a navigable river streambed. The trust sued first to declare the Salt Fork at that point was not navigable, then added the takings claim. The trial court denied the state’s jurisdictional plea and the court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Scott A. Brister, Justice Harriet O'Neill

08-0043 Timpte Industries Inc. v. Robert Gish and Pinnacol Assurance from Hale County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Gary Bellair, Lubbock For respondents: James Hoyt Wood, Amarillo The principal issues in this product-defect case are (1) whether in its summary-judgment motion Timpte waived its no-evidence point by failing to address the requisite unreasonable danger element and, if not, (2) whether Gish presented enough evidence of a design defect that posed an unreasonable danger or of a safer alternative design. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Scott A. Brister, Justice Harriet O'Neill

07-0806 Walter E. Harrell v. State of Texas from Terry County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: James Caleb Scott, Dallas For respondent: Jason Bujnosek, Brownfield The principal issues are (1) whether the state is required to follow garnishment procedures to take money from a prisoner’s inmate trust account to pay for his court-appointed attorney and court fees and (2) whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear Harrell’s appeal. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Scott A. Brister, Justice Harriet O'Neill

07-0931 City of Dallas v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas from Travis County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: James B. Pinson, Dallas For respondent: James C. Ho, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether delay for records clarification postpones 10-day deadline for city to seek public-information ruling by attorney general. The issues are (1) whether the Public Information Act’s 10-day deadline for a government entity to seek an attorney general’s opinion on records disclosure is postponed while the city awaits clarification on the records request and (2) whether the city can be compelled to disclose privileged attorney-client information if the request for the attorney general’s opinion was not submitted by the statutory deadline. In this case the city got two requests for records, one that it sought to clarify and the other resulting from that clarification request. Nine days after the second request, the city asked the attorney general for an opinion on whether certain requested information was covered by the attorney-client privilege and not subject to disclosure. When the attorney general answered that the request included privileged information that had to be disclosed because the city missed the deadline, the city sued the attorney general. The trial court ruled for the attorney general and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning in part that city did not show a compelling reason for withholding the records. The Court will hear three arguments beginning at 9 a.m. in the Hillcrest Classroom in the Underwood Law Library at Southern Methodist University‘s Dedman School of Law in Dallas. Each side in each case will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Scott A. Brister, Justice Harriet O'Neill

08-0379 In the Interest of J.O.A., T.J.A.M., T.J.M. and C.T.M. from Collingsworth County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioners: Trevor A. Woodruff, Austin For respondents: John Franklin McDonough III, Pampa The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether time limit on filing appellate points in parental-rights termination bars ineffective-assistance of counsel claim for attorney’s failure to file appellate points. The principal issue is whether the Family Code unconstitutionally bars a parental-rights termination appeal raising ineffective assistance of counsel based on the trial counsel’s failure to meet the threshold requirement to preserve such an appeal. In this case a father’s attorney failed to file a statement of appellate points – a requirement to proceed with an appeal – within 15 days of the termination order. Appointed counsel for the appeal raised ineffective assistance of counsel, a constitutional challenge, after the deadline for filing appellate points. The court of appeals found the statute violated the father’s due-process rights. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court’s staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court’s opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

Sitting for the court: Justice Paul W. Green, Justice Nathan L. Hecht, Chief Justice Wallace B. Jefferson, Justice Phil Johnson, Justice David Medina, Justice Dale Wainwright, Justice Don R. Willett, Justice Scott A. Brister, Justice Harriet O'Neill

07-0522 Benny P. Phillips, M.D. v. Dale Bramlett from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Jim Hund, Lubbock For respondents: John Smithee, Amarillo The Supreme Court will hear arguments of whether Stowers doctrine applies to avoid statutory damages cap in med-mal award. The principal issue is whether medical-malpractice damages are capped under the Medical Liability Insurance Improvement Act when the doctor’s liability insurer may be liable on a bad-faith claim. In this case the trial court ruled that the insurance company’s refusal to settle the case brought it under an exception to the statutory damages limit. Phillips also contends that the plaintiff’s jury argument – that they should send a message and “buck the liberal treatment” of doctors by previous med-mal juries – was incurable. In his lawsuit Bramlett claimed his wife died after a hysterectomy because her surgeon did not check on her before leaving the hospital and did not check his voice mail to learn early enough that she suffered from internal bleeding after her operation. Phillips argues that the jury’s multi-million verdict should have been capped by the medical-malpractice statute because the exception to those limits for an insurer that imprudently rejects a settlement offer – the basis of the Stowers doctrine – would not apply because the judgment was against the doctor, not the insurance company. Even if it does apply to the insurer, he contends, Bramlett did not prove the insurer refused an offer an “ordinary prudent insurer” should have accepted. The trial court refused to cap the damages and the court of appeals affirmed.