In this case alleging a financial institution lost documentation creating a survivorship right in a joint account, the principal issues are (1) whether Texas Probate Code section 439(a) bars extrinsic evidence of intent in a contract-breach claim over creation of the joint-tenancy account and (2) whether the "intertwining" exception to the duty to segregate attorney's fees should include fees recovery in a related federal court proceeding. Beyer sued A.G. Edwards & Sons for conversion and breach of contract, among other claims, after the company allegedly lost an agreement that would have made Beyer joint owner of her father's investment account and sole owner when he died. Four days before her father lapsed into a coma, A.G. Edwards told her the agreement was missing, then froze the $1.19 million account after he died. When Beyer initially sued for negligence, the company submitted the proceeds to federal court to determine ownership. In this case Beyer sought as damages the money from the account split among her siblings to settle the interpleader action in federal court. The court of appeals affirmed a breach-of-contract verdict, admitting evidence that showed the father's intent to create the joint account, and affirmed attorneys fees that were not segregated because the court held the fees were inextricably intertwined.

The issue is whether proceeds from bundled minerals leases must be proportionately reduced if one or more of the leases expire because production ceased. This case calls for interpreting a 1953 assignment of a production payment - an oil payment, as it's also called - from four minerals leases. McDaniel, the successor to the production payment, sued for contract breach and conversion after Apache Deepwater reduced the payment because two leases expired when production ceased. Apache argues that the production payment, like an overriding royalty interest, should be diminished when a lease ends and that Texas law does not require a proportionate-reduction clause. McDaniel contends the assignment specifies one fractional interest applied to all production from the designated surveys and, in the absence of a reduction clause, expresses the parties' intent to allocate risk. The trial court ruled for Apache, but the court of appeals reversed.

The issues in this case, which is governed by Chapter 95 of the Civil Practice & Remedies Code, are: (1) whether a fact issue exists about whether a landowner retained "some control" over an independent contractor's employee's work; (2) whether the common-law open-and-obvious defense applies to Chapter 95 and eliminates the landowner's duty to warn the independent contractor's employee of a danger, and if so, whether the independent contractor's employee raised a fact issue on the necessary-use exception to this defense; and (3) if the independent contractor's employee's knowledge of the dangerous condition did not obviate the landowner's obligation to issue an adequate warning, whether a fact issue exists about whether the landowner issued an adequate warning.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court erred in signing a judgment that disregarded the jury's award of exemplary damages due to language in the charge and a post-verdict jury poll indicating that the verdict was not unanimous.

City of El Paso, et al. v. Lilli M. Heinrich from El Paso County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioners: Eric G. Calhoun, Dallas, and Hadley A. Huchton, El Paso Respondent: Stewart W. Forbes, El Paso The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether immunity protects pension board sued over recalculated pension. The principal issues in this lawsuit to determine a widow's pension benefits are (1) whether the city and pension-benefits board retain immunity if the suit essentially is for money damages and (2) whether officials sued as individuals had governmental or official immunity. Heinrich sued after the pension board reduced by a third the pension she received after her police officer husband's death. That reflected the board's calculation for benefits that, it contended, should have been for her son under bylaws in effect when her husband died. The board initially approved 100 percent of the benefits to Heinrich, then determined in the later recalculation that the full-benefits provision to a spouse became effective after Heinrich's husband died. At first she sued for an amount she alleged was owed, but later pleaded the suit as one to declare her rights to the pension as originally calculated. The trial court denied the board's immunity defense. The court of appeals affirmed.

A principal issue in this school-financing challenge to the district's alleged unequal support for certain schools is whether the parents were required to exhaust administrative remedies before suing the district on a constitutional claim. In this case parents claimed the district's disparate support among its schools violated the state Constitution's equal-rights provision. Clint school district moved to dismiss on a jurisdictional plea because the parents did not raise their challenge in an administrative proceeding before suing. The trial court granted the district's plea, but the court of appeals reversed, holding the challenge raised constitutional claims exempt from the exhaustion-of-remedies requirement.

10-0490 El Apple I, Ltd. v. Myriam Olivas from El Paso County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioner: Joseph L. Hood Jr., El Paso For respondent: John P. Mobbs, El Paso A principal issue in this discrimination and retaliation suit is whether state or federal law governs attorneys-fees calculations under a state act enacted to effect a federal discrimination statute. Other issues challenge differing features of applying lodestar methods for calculating fees. In this case Olivas sued for sex discrimination and retaliation. A jury found her employer did not discriminate against her based on her gender, but that her discrimination complaint was a motivating factor in its creating a hostile-work environment. The trial court awarded attorneys fees supported by her lawyers' affidavits and not billing records, as federal law requires, and did not require the fees to break down how much time was spent separately on the discrimination and retaliation claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding in part that the affidavits were legally sufficient to support the trial court's fees award and that work on the claims was too intertwined to separate time spent on one versus time spent on the other. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

In this retaliatory-discharge case a principal issue is whether a nurse established her claim by showing a good-faith belief that she was reporting a legal violation when she accused a doctor of failing to get a patient's proper consent for a Cesarean section.

The issues are (1) whether Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 95 applies to Wallace and Elite's suit and (2) whether, if chapter 95 applies, Wallace and Elite created a fact issue regarding Energen's control of the work and knowledge of the dangerous conditions to establish an exception to liability limitations under section 95.003.

In this case seeking an injunction against groundwater contamination, the issues are (1) whether ExxonMobil met its burden to show contamination occurred before the limitations statute had expired and (2) whether ExxonMobil failed to object in writing to injunctive relief in this case in which it argues that diminution of the land value is proper damages standard.

The issue in this case concerns which party to a collateral attack on a judgment bears the summary-judgment burden to show whether the underlying judgment was obtained without regard for due process.

The issues are (1) whether an insurer has a reimbursement right from an insured for payment prompted by the insured's misrepresentations; (2) whether the insurer may get reimbursement from uninsured third parties that indirectly benefited from proceeds paid to the insured under the factual mistake; and (3) whether the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes the court of appeals' reconsideration of liability. In this case Gotham Insurance sued to recover proceeds it paid for losses its insured said resulted from a well-head blowout and fire. But Gotham determined that the losses were not covered by its policy and that its insured did not suffer a legal loss. In a third appeal, the court of appeals held that Gotham's reimbursement was barred under the Court's holdings in Texas Association of Counties v. Matagorda County and Excess Underwriters v. Frank's Casing.

The issue is whether the rule in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v Gandy - that a full adversarial trial must be shown to defeat a collusion allegation - applies to negate a defendant's assignment of a bench-trial award to plaintiffs seeking recovery from the defendant's insurer.

06-0904 Guitar Holding Co., L.P. v. Hudspeth County Underground Water Conservation District No. 1, et al. from Hudspeth County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioner: Joseph L. Hood Jr., El Paso; Russell S. Johnson, Austin For respondents: Renea Hicks and Lambeth Townsend, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether conservation district's restrictions on new water-transfer application violate state law and landowner's equal-protection rights. The issues in this water-transfer challenge arising from an attempt by El Paso to buy and transfer water from nearby Hudspeth County are (1) whether the conservation district's transfer rules violate state law prohibiting more restrictive conditions on out-of-district transfer applications and (2) whether the district's transfer rules violate the landowner's equal-protection rights. As part of its aquifer-conservation plan, the Hudspeth County district imposed restrictions on transferring water based on historical water use. That means, in this case, Guitar, which had not used as much water in the past as smaller landowners, could not transfer as much water as the smaller landowners. Guitar argues that those restrictions violate provisions of Senate Bill 2, an amendment to the comprehensive groundwater law enacted in 1997. The trial court held the conservation district's rules valid. The appeals court affirmed.

In this dispute over unclaimed settlement proceeds from a class-action settlement, the principal issues are (1) whether the court has jurisdiction when Highland Homes, the sole petitioner, has expressly disclaimed interest in the unclaimed money; (2) whether identified but non-participating class members have a property right in the settlement money; and (3) whether an agreement to distribute unclaimed money to a non-profit (the Nature Conservancy) improperly circumvents statutory abandoned-property provisions. One of Highland Homes' subcontractors sued to recover money the construction company withheld from its paycheck after the company told its subcontractors it would do so if they could not provide proof that they carried liability insurance. That subcontractor then converted the lawsuit into a class action. For its part Highland Homes contended the money it withheld was to pay its extra insurance costs, but the subcontractors believed Highland Homes was providing insurance coverage for them. After the class was approved, but before trial, Highland Homes agreed to a settlement that provided any settlement checks that were not claimed after 90 days would be given to the Nature Conservancy. As the trial court considered the settlement, the state moved to intervene to prevent distribution of the leftover money to the Nature Conservancy, arguing that state law prevented such private agreements to distribute unclaimed money and provided a procedure for unclaimed property to revert to the state after three years. The trial court denied the state's intervention, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the unclaimed-property law applied.

At issue in this case is whether a second year psychiatry resident qualifies as a "psychiatrist" under Section 574.009(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code.

At issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting plaintiff a new trial.

The principal issues are (1) whether an appellate court may evaluate a new-trial order on the merits in a mandamus proceeding and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial in the interest of justice and as a sanction for alleged violation of an order barring disclosure of an investigating officer's conclusion about seatbelt use in a rollover accident. In the underlying suit a driver's family claimed he died when he was ejected from the vehicle because its restraint system failed. After the jury found for Toyota, the family moved for a new trial, contending Toyota's counsel violated the motion in limine in closing argument by referring to the officer's conclusion that the driver was not wearing a seatbelt. The trial court granted the new-trial motion, ruling that Toyota willfully disregarded its ruling on the in-limine motion and that an instruction to jurors could not eliminate the harm. The appeals court affirmed.

The central issue in this case is whether compulsory joinder extends to subsequent purchasers of stock when a lawsuit between other parties effectively adjudicates the stock's ownership.

The issues in this case are (1) whether Whataburger has an adequate remedy available on appeal when it can no longer take an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to compel arbitration because it had no notice of the order denying the motion until after the deadline for an appeal expired, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Whataburger’s motion to reconsider its motion to compel arbitration.

The primary issue in this case is whether a corporate officer simultaneously owes a formal fiduciary duty to the corporation and an informal fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of an individual shareholder.

The question in this case is whether a party to a trust-modification proceeding entitled to a jury trial.

The main issue on appeal is whether Iraan-Sheffield ISD lawfully entered into a contingent-fee agreement with an attorney under Section 6.30(c) of the Texas Tax Code, which authorizes taxing units to hire private counsel on a contingent-fee basis "to represent the unit to enforce the collection of delinquent taxes."

This case presents a dispute over the current ownership of an undivided one-eighth interest in the mineral rights to a family ranch, which turns on the scope of a 1998 deed purporting to convey all the grantor's right, title, and interest in the ranch.

A principal issue in this retaliatory-discharge case is whether the appeals court erred by rejecting a legal-sufficiency challenge arguing that no evidence established discrimination or retaliation. In this case Melendez sued, alleging Kingsaire fired him for filing a workers-compensation claim after he was injured by a falling object in his demolition job. Evidence showed Kingsaire assisted him in applying for workers-comp and later told him it was placing him on family-medical leave, limiting him to 12 weeks' paid leave. But the company did not tell him when that time would end and did not tell him he would be fired if he did not return to work at the leave's end. Three days after his paid time ended, and before his physician cleared him to work, Kingsaire discharged him by letter. The letter specified he could seek reinstatement after his physician decided he could work. Melendez sued instead. The appeals court held the evidence legally and factually sufficient to affirm judgment for Melendez.

The issue is whether an insurer violates the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act when it accepts a benefits claim under an insurance policy, makes partial payment of what the insured seeks and later pays an additional amount after appraisal.

A primary issue in this case is whether the State can conclusively establish Medicaid fraud at summary judgment when scienter is an essential element of the claim.

The issue in this workers-compensation claim, involving a deputy sheriff killed in an accident in his county patrol car coming from an extracurricular security job at a college football game, is whether he was within the scope of his county employment when he was paid by the university.

The issues in this case brought by home-schooling parents are (1) whether, under the Texas Education Code, the parents must exhaust administrative remedies before suing the school district; (2) whether school districts can require home-schooling parents to follow curriculum guidelines to assure a bona fide education; and, if so, (3) whether requiring a certain curriculum violates the parents' 14th Amendment liberty interests. A school district attendance officer threatened the McIntyres with violating compulsory-attendance laws when they would not answer requests for their curriculum for teaching their children. In response, the McIntyres sued. The trail court ruled against the school district on its jurisdictional plea, contending the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the McIntyres did not exhaust administrative remedies or give pre-suit notice to the district. The court of appeals reversed.

At issue in this case is whether courts are barred from considering deed records in a collateral attack on a default judgment. A second issue is whether a rule that bars such evidence shields a default judgment from an otherwise meritorious due process claim. Other issues raised are whether a property owner’s due process rights were violated in obtaining the default judgment and whether the doctrine of laches or provisions in the Tax Code bar a collateral attack on the judgment.

This case presents two questions about contract interpretation of oil and gas leases plus another question about tortious interference with contract. First, what is the best reading of this force majeure clause? Second, how does this contract and possibly other oil-and-gas contracts measure how far a "wellbore extends horizontally in the producing formation"? Third, do the facts here present a fact issue about tortious interference in contract?

The issue in this motor vehicle-accident case is whether evidence that a seat belt was not used should be admissible to mitigate damages. Aydee Romero's estate sued Nabors and its tanker-transport truck driver for Romero's death and other passengers' injuries resulting from an early morning crash outside Fort Stockton. Romero and the other passengers were thrown from the Chevrolet Suburban as it rolled after hitting the tanker truck when passing. At trial, Nabors offered doctors' testimony that the passengers' injuries indicated they were not wearing seat belts and offered an expert's conclusion that failure to employ the seat belts probably caused the injuries. But the trial court refused to admit the testimony. Jurors found both Nabors and the truck driver negligent and awarded damages. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude the seat-belt evidence. It reasoned that the Legislature's repeal of two statutes barring seat-belt evidence did not overturn Carnation Co. v. Wong, a 1974 decision barring such evidence and predating the statutes. In this appeal Nabors argues (1) that the Legislature's repeal should imply that seat-belt evidence is admissible to mitigate damages and (2) that Carnation should be overturned because it was based on contributory evidence, not the proportionate-responsibility framework Texas follows today.

The issue in this case is what damages, if any, are recoverable in a medical negligence action based on wrongful pregnancy.

The issue in this case is whether an assignment of mineral interests is limited by the depths described in the referenced exhibit.

The principal issue is whether enough evidence supports a jury finding that Rodriguez's whistleblower report was the but-for cause of her termination.

In this contract-breach claim the issues are (1) whether the Public Utilities Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim or, if not, (2) whether the claim is barred by the fixed-rate doctrine.

The main issue on appeal is whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's order granting summary judgment on Dawn Thompson's retaliation claim by failing to properly analyze causation.

In this appeal by a juvenile who pleaded true to aggravated sexual assault of his 5-year-old brothers but moved later to withdraw his stipulation, the issues are (1) whether he properly raised, as a 13-year-old, that he could not have had the legal intent necessary to prove the alleged acts; (2) whether he properly raised an effective-assistance-of-counsel claim or, even if not, whether enough evidence supported one; and (3) whether under In re B.W., concerning a 13-year-old charged with prostitution, legal intent could be shown to establish sexual assault in this case.

The issue is whether a company is vicariously liable for an employee's negligence in an accident occurring after work because it paid the employee to drive other employees to the job site.

The principal issues in this medical-malpractice case are (1) whether the 10-year repose statute applied to a health care-liability claim by a minor injured before she turned 8 violates the Texas constitution's open-courts provision and (2) whether the repose statute, enacted in 2003, is unconstitutionally retroactive when applied to a claim that arose in 1996. Rivera, suing on behalf of her disabled daughter, claims the disability resulted from the hospital's failure to assess symptoms that led to an emergency cesarean birth a day after Rivera sought treatment. Rivera sued when her daughter was 14. In its defense the hospital argued that no evidence supported the claim because of the 10-year repose statute. The trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the repose statute violated the Texas Constitution's open-courts provision.

The issues in this case are (1) whether morbid obesity qualifies as a disability under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act if the employer does not regard the obesity as caused by a separate condition; and (2) whether the employer waived attorney-client privilege.

The issue in this age-discrimination case is whether the appeals court erred by affirming denial of the university's jurisdictional plea, either by the court's McDonnell Douglas analysis to establish a prima facie case or by determining legally sufficient evidence established a fact issue on the employee's job-replacement theory.

The issues are (1) whether, under the Local Government Contract Claims Act, a contract must be binding and enforceable to waive immunity and (2) whether payments to a subcontractor that Amex Properties claims as necessary to perform the contract may be recovered under the act.

The principal issues in this forfeiture action are (1) whether the state's summary-judgment evidence established a fact question on probable cause, that is, whether an affidavit based on hearsay sufficiently established probable cause in a civil action, and (2) whether the trial court erred by disposing all the state's claims when the summary-judgment motion ostensibly addressed money seizure from illegal drug activity and not the state's other claim, that the money seized was connected to money laundering. In this case the state sued for forfeiture after officers seized $90,235 in plastic bags they found after a drug-sniffing dog indicated a narcotics smell in a vehicle (and, after the search, on the money). Bueno, the driver (his real name), moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The court of appeals affirmed.

08-1049 University of Texas at El Paso v. Alfredo Herrera from El Paso County and the Eighth District Court of Appeals, El Paso For petitioner: Sean D. Jordan, Austin For respondent: John P. Mobbs, El Paso In this complaint that the university violated the Family and Medical Leave Act, a principal issue is whether Congress abrogated the state's sovereign immunity under a provision that allows leave for an employee's serious health condition ("self-care" leave provision). The argument in part depends on whether Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, holding that Congress annulled state immunity in the family-leave act's separate "family-care provision," extends to the statute's self-care provision. UTEP argues in part that Congress acted under the commerce clause in enacting the self-care provision, a basis that cannot authorize abrogation of state sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the university's jurisdictional plea. Relying on Hibbs, the court of appeals affirmed. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by placing the burden of proof on the petitioner to establish that the subject leases were "top leases" instead of new leases and (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the trial court's implied finding that the lessors did not intend that the leases constituted a release of previous leases.

In this action by an workers-compensation insurer to recover from a settlement with a liable third party the issue is whether a state insurance-department subrogation waiver override the insurer's statutory right to reimbursement.