In this health care-liability claim, a principal issue is whether a chiropractor's expert testimony was improper to establish the duty to inform. Felton sued after he suffered a stroke as Dr. Lovett manipulated Felton's neck to relieve pain. Doctors determined the stroke resulted from a tear in a spinal artery. A jury found for Lovett on Felton's negligence claim, but for Felton on his second claim, that Lovett failed to inform him of the risk posed by the neck manipulation. The court of appeals reversed, noting Felton's expert, a chiropractor, testified that neck manipulations were risky only if a problem exists with the spinal artery or if the adjustment were performed improperly. In this appeal Felton argues that the appeals court relied on the chiropractor's opinion as it addressed causation, which he was not qualified by statute to give.

The issue is whether limitations to recover from general partners a partnership's judgment debt begin when the debt judgment was entered or when the underlying contract-breach action accrued. In 1993 American Star sued S&J Investments, the partnership, for breach of an operating agreement. American Star won a judgment in 2007 for almost $230,000, which was final in 2009. When partnership assets failed to satisfy the judgment, American Star sued Stowers and other general partners in 2010 to confirm their liability. The trial court granted summary judgment for the partners, ruling that the suit against the partners on the debt was brought too late because that suit accrued at the same time as the breach-of-contract claim against the partnership. In a split decision, the appeals court affirmed.

Among principal issues are (1) whether the appeals court erred by rendering judgment on an issue not raised in the appeal below; (2) whether the appeals court erred by reversing a decision on adverse possession because it concluded the Brumleys pleaded their cause as one to quiet title and not on trespass to try title and (3) whether adverse possession was tried by consent.

The primary issue in this case is whether an insurer's ability to rescind a life insurance policy based on an applicant's material misrepresentation requires proof of the applicant's intent to deceive.

Principal issues in this nuisance and trespass case against three operators of gas-compressor stations and one pipeline company are (1) whether limitations bars the plaintiffs' claims; (2) whether state and federal clean-air laws preempt the claims; (3) whether the town of DISH (yes, all caps - named after the satellite-television provider) has statutory authority to sue; and (4) whether plaintiffs may recover for prospective injury or mental anguish, abatement of an ongoing nuisance or $1,000-a-day fines against the energy companies.

07-0522 Benny P. Phillips, M.D. v. Dale Bramlett from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Jim Hund, Lubbock For respondents: John Smithee, Amarillo The Supreme Court will hear arguments of whether Stowers doctrine applies to avoid statutory damages cap in med-mal award. The principal issue is whether medical-malpractice damages are capped under the Medical Liability Insurance Improvement Act when the doctor's liability insurer may be liable on a bad-faith claim. In this case the trial court ruled that the insurance company's refusal to settle the case brought it under an exception to the statutory damages limit. Phillips also contends that the plaintiff's jury argument - that they should send a message and "buck the liberal treatment" of doctors by previous med-mal juries - was incurable. In his lawsuit Bramlett claimed his wife died after a hysterectomy because her surgeon did not check on her before leaving the hospital and did not check his voice mail to learn early enough that she suffered from internal bleeding after her operation. Phillips argues that the jury's multi-million verdict should have been capped by the medical-malpractice statute because the exception to those limits for an insurer that imprudently rejects a settlement offer - the basis of the Stowers doctrine - would not apply because the judgment was against the doctor, not the insurance company. Even if it does apply to the insurer, he contends, Bramlett did not prove the insurer refused an offer an "ordinary prudent insurer" should have accepted. The trial court refused to cap the damages and the court of appeals affirmed.

The principal issues in this dispute over calculating health care-liability damages are (1) whether the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its mandate on remand; (2) whether post-judgment interest accrues from the first trial-court judgment or from the judgment on remand; and (3) whether the trial court properly vacated its first judgment when the Supreme Court remanded without instructions to vacate. In a first appeal in this case, in which Dr. Phillips contended the trial court erred by not capping, the Supreme Court remanded, holding that damages awarded against Dr. Phillips should have been capped consistent with the Court's opinion. On remand the trial court entered a second judgment, capping damages and awarding post-judgment interest beginning with the second judgment's date. When Bramlett appealed, the appeals court rejected Phillips' dismissal motion - based on his contention that the Supreme Court retained exclusive jurisdiction - and reversed to calculate interest from the first judgment.

A threshold issue is whether the appeals court lacked authority to consider an order denying arbitration when the order was not contested on interlocutory appeal. In this case the losing party, Hart of Texas Cattle Feeders, challenged the arbitration denial by mandamus two months after the trial court's order, lost that, then brought its challenge after a trial on the merits.

The issues are (1) whether Laddex lacks standing because its "top lease" is void for violating the state constitutional Rule Against Perpetuities and (2) whether evidence supports the trial court's judgment terminating BP's lease for production below paying quantities.

The issues in this contest over the commercial viability of a producer's lease are (1) whether Red Deer, the top-lease holder, secured a necessary finding that a well was incapable of producing in paying quantities when BP, the producer, stopped its production and invoked a shut-in royalty clause; (2) whether the trial court's judgment that the lease lapsed was based on inconsistent jury findings, one that production in paying quantities had not failed before the well was shut in and the other that on the shut-in date the well was incapable of commercial production; (3) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the verdict; and (4) whether the trial court erred by rejecting BP's proposed instructions.

The issue in this legal-malpractice case is whether limitations are tolled under Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins for assets-transfer advice that led to a judgment against Renda by the federal government for violating the federal Priority Act. Renda sued seven months after the government's judgment and 11 years after the advice on the assets transfer.

In this specific-performance case, seeking to enforce a recorded first-refusal right to purchase mineral interests, the issues are (1) whether the Archer trust suffered an injury when the minerals interest was sold or when, long after, the trust learned its right had been breached and (2) whether the discovery rule applies if the right accrued when the sale was completed.

In this specific-performance case, seeking to enforce a recorded first-refusal right to purchase mineral interests, the issues are (1) whether the Archer trust suffered an injury when the minerals interest was sold or when, long after, the trust learned its right had been breached and (2) whether the discovery rule applies if the right accrued when the sale was completed.

07-0931 City of Dallas v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas from Travis County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: James B. Pinson, Dallas For respondent: James C. Ho, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether delay for records clarification postpones 10-day deadline for city to seek public-information ruling by attorney general. The issues are (1) whether the Public Information Act's 10-day deadline for a government entity to seek an attorney general's opinion on records disclosure is postponed while the city awaits clarification on the records request and (2) whether the city can be compelled to disclose privileged attorney-client information if the request for the attorney general's opinion was not submitted by the statutory deadline. In this case the city got two requests for records, one that it sought to clarify and the other resulting from that clarification request. Nine days after the second request, the city asked the attorney general for an opinion on whether certain requested information was covered by the attorney-client privilege and not subject to disclosure. When the attorney general answered that the request included privileged information that had to be disclosed because the city missed the deadline, the city sued the attorney general. The trial court ruled for the attorney general and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning in part that city did not show a compelling reason for withholding the records. The Court will hear three arguments beginning at 9 a.m. in the Hillcrest Classroom in the Underwood Law Library at Southern Methodist University's Dedman School of Law in Dallas. Each side in each case will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issues in this dispute raising application of the accommodation doctrine to groundwater rights are (1) whether jurisdiction exists over this interlocutory appeal; (2) whether the accommodation doctrine applies to a severed groundwater estate; and (3) whether the groundwater-rights grant, providing access to the land to get the water, precludes the accommodation doctrine. Coyote Lake Ranch, a cattle-raising operation, sued Lubbock for property damage the city caused by mowing grass and building roads to drill wells to pump water it owns under the ranch. The trial court temporarily enjoined Lubbock from its work by applying the accommodation doctrine - a principle of oil-and-gas law that requires the mineral-rights owner to give "due regard" to the surface owner's rights. The appeals court overturned the temporary injunction, holding that the accommodate doctrine does not apply to groundwater rights held by an owner different from the surface owner.

The principal issues in these cases are (1) whether, in Greer, a public official's status as a libel plaintiff alleging harm from an online publication should be according to his notoriety in his community or assessed by the Internet's worldwide reach and (2) whether, in Sullivan, the text of the Texas Citizens' Participation Act allows "justice and equity" as a basis to reduce attorney fees or only for "other expenses" for a successful defendant defeating a libel claim under the statute. These appeals arise from a political blog post that initially alleged Abraham, a school-board member in Canadian, Texas, was forced by state troopers from a campaign event 230 miles from Canadian for a state representative he opposed. When Abraham complained that he left voluntarily and that troopers were not involved, the blog corrected the story in updates. Abraham then sued for libel, naming in one suit the organization and its director publishing the blog and in the other Sullivan, a political activist Abraham accused as the story's source. The trial court dismissed both suits, based on the Texas Citizens' Participation Act. The appeals court reversed both trial-court decisions. In Greer the court held that the blog did not relate to Abraham's conduct as a school trustee, thus the liability standard Abraham had to meet to avoid dismissal was not as great as the trial court ruled. In Sullivan the court of appeals affirmed the attorney fees and costs the trial court awarded Sullivan.

The issue in this defamation case is whether, under the Texas Tort Claims Act, direct evidence of intent and motivation must be shown to establish a government employee acted within the scope of her employment.

In this defamation case by a deacon among a list of clergy published on the church website and in a press release, the issues are (1) whether the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine bars the libel claim when a church internally decides to disclose inside information to the public at large and (2) whether Guerrero, the deacon, presented clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case of each element of his defamation claim.

The issue in this case is whether section 16.063 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code tolls the statute of limitations on an action when a resident defendant is physically absent from the state even though the defendant is still amenable to service by Texas courts.

This case results from a single-vehicle accident after Texas A&M University changed the design of an intersection and presents the issues of (1) the scope of an exception to the waiver of governmental immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act for a governmental unit's exercise of discretionary powers, (2) when an off-road defect constitutes a special defect under the act, and (3) whether a plaintiff should be provided an opportunity to replead when the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction challenges only the failure to plead sufficient facts and not the existence of facts establishing jurisdiction.

09-0828 Genesis Tax Loan Services Inc., et al. v. Kody and Janet Kothmann from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioners: G. Roland Love, Dallas For respondents: Mont McClendon, Lubbock The issues in this case between competing liens is (1) whether the appeals court erred by holding that Genesis, which claims a tax-lien transfer on four properties, was required to plead its lien superiority as an affirmative defense and (2) whether the appeals court misconstrued Texas Tax Code section 32.06 by holding that Genesis failed to effect transfer of the tax liens. The Kothmanns sold four properties on an installment plan and filed deeds of trust against the properties. Two years later the buyer borrowed money from Genesis Tax Loan Services to pay taxes on the properties and Genesis secured the loan with tax-lien transfers. When the borrower defaulted, Genesis tried to foreclose. The Kothmanns then sued Genesis, arguing that their liens were superior because they filed theirs first, Genesis did not plead its tax-lien transfers in defense and did not comply with requirements to effect the transfers. The trial court declared Genesis' liens were superior, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that Genesis had to plead its liens were superior as a defense and that the liens did not comply with statutory requirements. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0806 Walter E. Harrell v. State of Texas from Terry County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: James Caleb Scott, Dallas For respondent: Jason Bujnosek, Brownfield The principal issues are (1) whether the state is required to follow garnishment procedures to take money from a prisoner's inmate trust account to pay for his court-appointed attorney and court fees and (2) whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to hear Harrell's appeal. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

At issue is whether Section 32.0705(d) of the Human Resources Code imposes a mandatory one-year time limit for the Health and Human Services Commission to conduct external audits of "Medicaid contractors."

At issue in this parental rights case is whether lower courts interpreted Texas Family Code Section 161.0001(b)(1)(o) in an improperly expansive manner and whether Texas courts have jurisdiction in this case under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act because a New Mexico court initially determined custody in this case.

In this defamation case by a deacon among a list of clergy published on the church website and in a press release, the issues are (1) whether the ecclesiastical-abstention doctrine bars the libel claim when a church internally decides to disclose inside information to the public at large and (2) whether Guerrero, the deacon, presented clear and specific evidence establishing a prima facie case of each element of his defamation claim.

08-0379 In the Interest of J.O.A., T.J.A.M., T.J.M. and C.T.M. from Collingsworth County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioners: Trevor A. Woodruff, Austin For respondents: John Franklin McDonough III, Pampa The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether time limit on filing appellate points in parental-rights termination bars ineffective-assistance of counsel claim for attorney's failure to file appellate points. The principal issue is whether the Family Code unconstitutionally bars a parental-rights termination appeal raising ineffective assistance of counsel based on the trial counsel's failure to meet the threshold requirement to preserve such an appeal. In this case a father's attorney failed to file a statement of appellate points - a requirement to proceed with an appeal - within 15 days of the termination order. Appointed counsel for the appeal raised ineffective assistance of counsel, a constitutional challenge, after the deadline for filing appellate points. The court of appeals found the statute violated the father's due-process rights. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The issue is whether named plaintiffs adequately represent a proposed landowners class in a riverbed-boundary dispute with the state General Land Office when the class would include landowners who settled with the state over the boundary and mineral rights resulting from it. A subsidiary question is whether the state, by its agreement with landowners after the class suit was filed, created a conflict with named plaintiffs. In this case the named plaintiffs, landowners along the Canadian River eastward from Lake Meredith in the Texas Panhandle, lost their effort to certify a class alleging the state took mineral rights when it established new river boundaries for the Canadian below the dam that created the lake. The state argues that the named plaintiffs do not adequately represent the putative class because many landowners along the river in the putative class settled with the state on their mineral rights based on a 1981 survey that fixed the river's streambed width. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's class-certification denial.

The principal issue in this crop-insurance case against a broker is whether an arbitration agreement incorporating American Arbitration Association rules shows clearly and unmistakably that a signatory intended an arbitrator to decide that arbitration covers claims against a party that did not sign the agreement.

The principal issue in this defamation case involving two Texas Tech medical professors is whether one's statements that the other "deals in half truths, which legally is the same as a lie" and has a "reputation for lack of veracity" constitute defamation by itself. Those statements, by Dr. Hancock, were in a resignation letter to the medical school dean complaining about Dr. Variyam, his supervisor and then the gastroenterology division chair. Hancock was responding to a letter Variyam wrote him, criticizing his patient care. Jurors rejected Hancock's truth defense and awarded Variyam damages after the trial court directed a verdict that Hancock's letter to the dean was libelous per se.

The primary issue in these cases is whether an anti-abortion advocate is entitled to a Texas Citizens Participation Act dismissal of defamation claims brought for referring to certain abortion-related organizations as "criminal organizations."

The issue is whether a water district has governmental immunity from a contract claim primarily involving a real-property conveyance but contemplating services by the lessee that principally would benefit the general public. Church & Akin, which operated a marina on a lake near Lubbock (yes) under lease by the county water district, sued when the district terminated the lease. The lease was for three years, with an option to extend it so long as Church & Akin complied with its lease terms. Dissatisfied with the hours the lessee kept, the district ordered Church & Akin to vacate after the second term began and the company had paid for the year. The trial court denied the district's jurisdictional plea, based on Texas Local Government Code section 271.152 (waiving immunity in a contract suit with its essential terms providing goods and services to the local governmental entity). The appeals court affirmed.

The principal issues in these cases are (1) whether, in Greer, a public official's status as a libel plaintiff alleging harm from an online publication should be according to his notoriety in his community or assessed by the Internet's worldwide reach and (2) whether, in Sullivan, the text of the Texas Citizens' Participation Act allows "justice and equity" as a basis to reduce attorney fees or only for "other expenses" for a successful defendant defeating a libel claim under the statute. These appeals arise from a political blog post that initially alleged Abraham, a school-board member in Canadian, Texas, was forced by state troopers from a campaign event 230 miles from Canadian for a state representative he opposed. When Abraham complained that he left voluntarily and that troopers were not involved, the blog corrected the story in updates. Abraham then sued for libel, naming in one suit the organization and its director publishing the blog and in the other Sullivan, a political activist Abraham accused as the story's source. The trial court dismissed both suits, based on the Texas Citizens' Participation Act. The appeals court reversed both trial-court decisions. In Greer the court held that the blog did not relate to Abraham's conduct as a school trustee, thus the liability standard Abraham had to meet to avoid dismissal was not as great as the trial court ruled. In Sullivan the court of appeals affirmed the attorney fees and costs the trial court awarded Sullivan.

These cases, consolidated for briefing, raise two issues. First, they concern whether misnumbering and misfiling a timely motion for new trial constitutes proper grounds for dismissal of the subsequent appeal as untimely. Second, they address whether transferee courts of appeals should apply principles of horizontal stare decisis when identifying a transferor court's controlling precedent.

These cases, consolidated for briefing, raise two issues. First, they concern whether misnumbering and misfiling a timely motion for new trial constitutes proper grounds for dismissal of the subsequent appeal as untimely. Second, they address whether transferee courts of appeals should apply principles of horizontal stare decisis when identifying a transferor court's controlling precedent.

The issue in this mineral lease assignment sold through a clearinghouse is whether the Neuhoffs conveyed an overriding-royalty interest in a wellbore only or in the entire lease surrounding the well.

The principal issues are (1) whether the "strip and gore" doctrine applies to subsume mineral interests under a strip adjoining property conveyed by the strip owner who severed and reserved mineral rights under the strip when she deeded it surface rights to a power company for a transmission line and (2) whether the appeals court erred by affirming an order compelling joinder of adjacent mineral-interest holders mailed royalty checks. In this case Crawford contested the trial court's joinder order in his breach-of-contract suit against XTO for failure to pay royalties based on mineral rights under the strip he got from his mother.

The issue is whether a post-answer default judgment may establish damages in a Stowers action an insured assigned to wrongful-death plaintiffs. In essence, the argument is whether a conflict exists between Evanston Insurance v. ATOFINA, holding that an insurer may not challenge a settlement's reasonableness when the insurer refuses a defense or coverage, and State Farm Fire and Casualty v. Gandy's reasoning that an insured's valid damages evidence must result from a fully adversarial proceeding. In the underlying wrongful-death trial, the defendant drilling company, Diatom, answered Seger's lawsuit but lost a $15-million default judgment after not appearing for trial. The company's insurers had refused to defend or settle despite offers to settle within policy limits. On the Stowers claim, the appeals court reversed the trial court's judgment for Seger, holding that the judgment was not good evidence of damages because it did not result from a fully adversarial trial.

The issues in this case are (1) whether a homeowners’ association has standing to sue a planning and zoning commission for approving a nonconforming plat, and (2) whether mandamus relief is available to compel that commission to rescind its approval of the plat until the plat complies with relevant regulations.

At issue in this case is whether the statutory licensing requirement and conflict of interest prohibition for public insurance adjusting are content based restraints of free speech subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.

The issue is whether certain university entities are immune from Martinez's age-discrimination suit under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act.

07-0945 Texas Parks and Wildlife Department v. The Sawyer Trust from Donley County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Kristofer S. Monson, Austin For respondent: Jody Sheets, Dallas This dispute over a mining permit to take sand and gravel from what the state contends is a navigational stream bed raises these principal issues: (1) whether the state's jurisdictional immunity plea fails because the trust alleges the state is unconstitutionally "taking" its property and, if not, (2) whether state officials must be sued instead of the state itself. In this case the trust seeks to sell sand and gravel from the bed of the Salt Fork of the Red River traversing its property. By statute the state, through the parks department, owns sand and gravel in a navigable river streambed. The trust sued first to declare the Salt Fork at that point was not navigable, then added the takings claim. The trial court denied the state's jurisdictional plea and the court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issue in this contest over a tax exemption is whether a non-profit municipal corporation that owns student housing lost the basis for its exemption when it housed mostly high-school students for summer camps and programs. Specifically, did Texas Student Housing Authority satisfy exemptions provided by Texas Tax Code section 11.11(a) (used for public purposes), Texas Education Code section 53.46 (benefiting students in an accredited higher-education institution) or Tax Code 11.11(e) (not used for other than college students or state employees)? Texas Student Housing, created in 1995 by Westlake, a municipality near Denton, sued after the appraisal district revoked the tax exemption for a dorm it owns near Texas A&M University because the dorm housed students attending summer camps and programs on campus. The trial court rendered judgment for the appraisal district. The appeals court affirmed the revocation for two of three years, but reversed for the third, holding that programs for one summer were related definitely and intimately to Texas A&M's legislative mandate.

08-0941 The Travelers Insurance Co. v. Barry Joachim from Lubbock County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Christopher B. Slayton, Lubbock For respondent: Stace Williams, Lubbock The issue is whether, after a nonsuit, the trial court's order dismissing a case with prejudice for failing to prosecute it is a final-merits determination that bars a later suit. In this case Travelers sought to dismiss Joachim's second suit against it because the trial court in the first suit dismissed that one in an order barring refiling. Travelers argues that dismissal of the first suit with prejudice, though otherwise improper, became a decisions on the merits when Joachim failed to challenge it. Instead of challenging the order in the first suit, Joachim filed an identical claim in a second court. After the trial court initially denied Travelers' summary-judgment motion, based on res judicata, another judge on reconsideration granted the motion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that dismissal of a case for want of prosecution was not a merits determination and could not be ordered with prejudice. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0043 Timpte Industries Inc. v. Robert Gish and Pinnacol Assurance from Hale County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: Gary Bellair, Lubbock For respondents: James Hoyt Wood, Amarillo The principal issues in this product-defect case are (1) whether in its summary-judgment motion Timpte waived its no-evidence point by failing to address the requisite unreasonable danger element and, if not, (2) whether Gish presented enough evidence of a design defect that posed an unreasonable danger or of a safer alternative design. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issue in this dispute over Yowell's overriding royalty-interest claim is whether the rule against a contingent property interest existing forever - the rule against perpetuities - bars Yowell's claim for unpaid royalties. A subsidiary issue is whether the rule applies when a corporation conveys the contingent interest.

The issues are (1) whether Texas law recognizes tortious interference with inheritance rights; (2) whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's fraud verdict and its damages award; (3) whether damages may be awarded based on the jury's undue-influence finding; and (4) whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding that a woman lacked mental capacity to amend her trust.

A principal issue from this product-liability and wrongful-death case is whether the appeals court erred by upholding sanctions against an attorney for surveying the population from which jurors would be selected ostensibly to test litigation themes.

A principal issue is whether a gas lease term assignment's retained-acreage clause required 320 acres be held back for each well subject to the lease.