06-0502 Jan N. Ogletree, M.D., and Heart Hospital of Austin v. Nancy Kay Matthews and Luann Matthews from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: TBA For respondents: Charles J. Young, Austin Principal issues in this medical-malpractice action are whether, under House Bill 4 amendments, (1) interlocutory appeal is available to challenge the trial court's decision to deny a dismissal motion based on an expert report's deficiency when the court also granted an extension to cure it; (2) whether those deficiencies can be cured by a report from a new expert; and (3) whether a defendant - the hospital in this case - waives a challenge to an expert report by not objecting to omission of a report addressing the required causation element. In this case the deficient expert report bearing on a physician's alleged negligence noted that another expert was needed to support the malpractice claim. Experts assessing the hospital's nursing care were nurses, who under the malpractice statute cannot offer an opinion that links negligence to the cause of death or injury. The hospital did not object to the expert reports until it moved to dismiss the case. The trial court denied the physician's and the hospital's dismissal motions, granted an extension to the cure the report on the physician's care and held the hospital waived its objection to reports on nursing care by objecting too late. The court of appeals affirmed.

05-0541 First American Title Insurance Co., et al. v. Comptroller of Public Accounts, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Steven Reed, Washington, D.C. For respondents: Christine Monzingo, Austin The principal issue is whether the comptroller's interpretation of Texas' "retaliatory" tax statute for premiums paid by out-of-state title-insurance companies violates federal and state equal-protection guaranties. Under the comptroller's recent interpretation of the law - which allows the state to tax at a rate equal to another state's higher tax on Texas title-insurance companies doing business there - Texas assesses the retaliatory rate based on how in-state insurers and agents divide the proceeds from title-insurance premiums. In Texas, by state law, insurers get 15 percent of the premiums paid and agents take 85 percent. Texas assumes insurers and agents divide the premium tax burden by the same ratio - 15 percent of the tax paid by the company, 85 percent by the agent, even if agents and insurers decide differently. The two out-of-state title insurers challenging this assessment argue that Texas charged them a retaliatory tax equal to 85 percent of the premium rate because their home states did not deem the division of the tax burden as Texas does. The companies argue in their challenge that the comptroller's assessment actually leads to Texas charging a retaliatory tax when the basis for one - higher premium tax rates in another state - may not exist and, in any case, would be higher than the home states'. The trial court held for the comptroller and the court of appeals affirmed.

07-0931 City of Dallas v. Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas from Travis County and the Seventh District Court of Appeals, Amarillo For petitioner: James B. Pinson, Dallas For respondent: James C. Ho, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether delay for records clarification postpones 10-day deadline for city to seek public-information ruling by attorney general. The issues are (1) whether the Public Information Act's 10-day deadline for a government entity to seek an attorney general's opinion on records disclosure is postponed while the city awaits clarification on the records request and (2) whether the city can be compelled to disclose privileged attorney-client information if the request for the attorney general's opinion was not submitted by the statutory deadline. In this case the city got two requests for records, one that it sought to clarify and the other resulting from that clarification request. Nine days after the second request, the city asked the attorney general for an opinion on whether certain requested information was covered by the attorney-client privilege and not subject to disclosure. When the attorney general answered that the request included privileged information that had to be disclosed because the city missed the deadline, the city sued the attorney general. The trial court ruled for the attorney general and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning in part that city did not show a compelling reason for withholding the records. The Court will hear three arguments beginning at 9 a.m. in the Hillcrest Classroom in the Underwood Law Library at Southern Methodist University's Dedman School of Law in Dallas. Each side in each case will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

06-1034 State of Texas v. George Lueck from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Ryan Clinton, Dallas For respondent: Gregory C. Douglass, Austin The issues in this Whistleblower Act case are (1) whether Lueck, a Texas Transportation Department employee fired for questioning an outside vendor's contract termination, properly stated a claim under the act to confer jurisdiction on the trial court and (2) whether, if so, he properly reported violation of a state or federal law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Hecht not sitting) 08-0172 Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Attorney General of Texas and The Dallas Morning News from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeal, Austin For petitioner: Jack Hohengarten, Austin For cross-petitioner/respondent Dallas News: Paul C. Watler, Dallas For respondent Attorney General of Texas: Brenda K. Loudermilk, Austin The issues in this open-records challenge are (1) whether common-law privacy exempts state employees' birth dates from disclosure under the Texas Public Information Act and (2) whether the newspaper, as intervenor, is entitled to attorneys fees under the act or under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act. In this case the comptroller sued the attorney general after it ruled that birth dates must be disclosed under the Public Information Act. The trial court granted the attorney general's summary-judgment motion and the court of appeals affirmed. As petitioner, the comptroller argues that the information should be exempt from the public-records law based on the privacy tort for intrusion upon seclusion. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0421 State of Texas v. Public Utility Commission of Texas from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Jonathan Day, Austin, and Alton J. Hall Jr., Houston For petitioners CenterPoint and Texas Genco: Thomas R. Phillips, Gregory S. Coleman, Austin For respondent: Elizabeth Sterling, Austin One principal issue in this challenge under the Public Utility Regulation Act is whether state utility commissioners properly rejected the "stranded costs" calculation for a power-generating company spun off from the parent utility. In this case CenterPoint, a Houston-based power company, established stranded costs - the difference between market value of the utilities' assets and their book value - based in part on stock in the new generating company it transferred to its own shareholders. State utility commissioners rejected the companies' partial-stock valuation method because the stock was not sold in a public offering, as the commission contends the electricity-deregulation law required. The utilities argue that market value could be established by share prices on stock that later sold. The state agrees that the partial-stock method failed to meet statutory requirements, but maintains the utility commission modified what the statute required to calculate the utilities' stranded costs. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0727 Texas Industrial Energy Consumers v. CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric LLC and Public Utility Commission of Texas from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Lino Mendiola and Jonathan Day, Austin For respondent CenterPoint: Ron Moss, Austin For respondent Public Utility Commission: Brian A. Prestwood, Austin In this electric-deregulation appeal the principal issues are (1) whether state utility commissioners had authority under the Public Utility Regulation Act to award more than 11 percent interest over 14 years on so-called competition transmission charges used to recover stranded costs from consumers and (2) whether the Public Utility Commission exceeded its authority by allowing a utility to pass along to consumers costs to assess its market value after deregulation. Central to the first issue is whether CenterPoint Energy Inc. v. Public Utility Commission (Tex. 2004) invalidated in its entirety the statutory provision allowing interest to be recovered on the uncollected competition transmission charges. As to the second issue, the PUC allowed the pass-through of valuation costs despite statutory language that such costs should be borne by the 'transferee utility." The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0523 Texas Lottery Commission v. First State Bank of DeQueen, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: James C. Ho, Austin For respondents: Jeffrey S. Boyd, Austin The issue is whether the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC 9.406(f)) makes ineffective the Texas Lottery Act's prohibition on a winner's assigning his final two annual payments. In this case Irvan, who won $9 million in the lottery in 1995, assigned all but the last two payments of his prize after the Legislature changed the lottery law in 1999. That amendment allows assignment of all annual payments but the last two. Then in 2006 he assigned the last two payments to pay a bank debt, for which he and the bank got approval from an Arkansas court. When the lottery commission refused to recognize the Arkansas court order, the bank sued in Texas to declare the UCC, which allows assignments, to render the lottery act restriction ineffective. First State Bank won a partial summary judgment, which the appeals courts affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0100 Travis Central Appraisal District v. Diane Lee Norman from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Jennifer Archimbaud Powell, Austin For respondent: R. Scott Clark, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the Labor Code provision interpreted to allow a public employee the right to sue on a workers-compensation retaliation claim should be re-examined or limited and (2) whether a public employee alleging retaliatory discharge in a workers-compensation dispute must exhaust administrative remedies before suing. The appraisal district argues that City of LaPorte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1995), holding that Texas Labor Code chapter 451 waives immunity for retaliatory discharge actions against political subdivisions, should be overturned because chapter 451 does not clearly and unambiguously waive sovereign immunity. And Barfield does not apply, the district contends, because Barfield addresses immunity from liability and not from suit, as this case. The trial court denied the appraisal district's jurisdictional plea. The court of appeals affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0958 Presidio Independent School District v. Robert Scott, Commissioner of Education from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Ken Slavin, El Paso For respondent: Daniel F. Geyser, Austin The principal issue is whether the education commissioner must consent to the school district's appeal to Travis County district court, under Education Code section 21.307(a), of the commissioner's reinstatement decision in a disciplinary action. In this case a Presidio school district employee fired by the district won reinstatement when he appealed his termination to the commissioner. With the employee's consent, the Presidio district sought review of the commissioner's decision in Travis County district court under section 21.307(a), which provides for review in Travis County if "all parties" consent. In a plea to the jurisdiction, the commissioner argued that his lack of consent robbed the district court of jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The district court denied the commissioner's plea and the court of appeals reversed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0481 Susan Combs and Greg Abbott v. Texas Entertainment Association Inc. and Karpod Inc. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: James C. Ho, Austin For respondent: Craig T. Enoch, Austin The issue is whether the First Amendment free-speech clause prohibits the state from collecting the so-called pole tax on each patron at clubs, restaurants or bars serving alcohol with live nude entertainment. In this lawsuit, the trial court declared the $5 tax unconstitutional and permanently enjoined the state comptroller from collecting it. The court of appeals affirmed in a split decision, holding that the tax was a content-based limitation on protected speech. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0497 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Texas Citizens for a Safe Future and Clean Water and James G. Popp from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner Railroad Commission: Daniel L. Geyser, Austin. For petitioner Pioneer Exploration: David B. Gross, Austin For respondents: Marisa Perales, Austin The issue is whether the Railroad Commission abused its discretion by failing to consider factors other than conservation and water pollution when determining whether an injection-well permit would be in the "public interest" under Texas Water Code section 27.051(b)(1). Popp and the Safe Future and Clean Water group sued the Railroad Commission over an injection-well permit it approved for oil- and gas-well waste without considering plaintiffs' uncontested public-interest evidence. That evidence purported to show large trucks hauling drilling waste and salt water to the injection well would be hazardous to other vehicles on narrow, winding gravel roads and endanger children and adults who walked on them. Injection wells are regulated by the Texas Environmental Quality Commission, if the waste to be injected does not come from an oil or gas well, and the Railroad Commission, if it does. On appeal from the commission, the trial court affirmed the commission's permit approval. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the public-interest factor's scope must be broader than the effect on oil and gas production. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Hecht not sitting) 08-1056 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Susan Combs and Greg Abbott from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: James T. McBride, Houston For amicus curiae WesternGeco LLC: Thomas R. Phillips, Austin, and Renn G. Neilson, Dallas For respondents: Kevin D. Van Oort, Austin The principal issues in this franchise tax dispute are (1) whether the company's income from selling its geophysical and seismic data constitutes receipts from a use of a "license" under Tax Code section 171.103 and (2) whether the comptroller abused its discretion by determining the licenses' place of "use" by the customers' mailing or billing addresses. TGS, which collects subsurface geophysical and seismic data worldwide, sued the state comptroller for assessing higher franchise taxes on its gross receipts and charging penalties and interest for underreported and underpaid taxes from its data sales. TGS argues that its gross receipts from the data sales result from selling intangible assets, subject to allocation by a customer's state of incorporation. But under Section 171.103, as amended in 1998, the comptroller counters, allocated income from a license is to Texas if the license were used in Texas. The comptroller used TGS customers' mailing or billing addresses to establish where the licenses were used. The trial court ruled for the comptroller, but reversed the penalties and interest. The court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0330 Liana Leordeanu v. American Protection Insurance Co. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Bradley Dean McClellan, Austin For respondent: Jack W. Latson, Austin The issue in this workers-compensation case is whether a traveling sales representative's car accident injury was in the course and within the scope of her employment. Leordeanu sued American Protection after it denied her benefits claim and after an administrative review upheld the denial. Her injury resulted from a one-car accident as she returned from dinner with a client, intending to stop at a company-provided storage unit before going to her home office nearby. She was driving a car provided and maintained by her company. The trial court ruled her injury was employment-related, but the appeals court reversed, holding that her trip had dual business and personal purposes and rejecting her argument that her injury was covered because she fell under the "continuous coverage" principle of workers-comp law. Leordeanu argues that the appeals court's holding would preclude coverage for any traveling sales representative headed home on a business trip. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0191 Hyde Park Baptist Church v. Tara Turner and Terry Curtis from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: David M. Pruessner, Dallas For respondents: Laurie Higginbotham, Austin In this case involving a teacher's intentional injury of a child at a church-run school, principal issues are (1) whether mental-anguish damages were proper against the church when (a) a significant injury arguably was not involved and (b) the church waived those damages by failing to object to how damages were submitted to the jury, by broad form; (2) whether mental-anguish damages were proper against the church when the jury found it negligent but not that it acted with malice; and (3) whether the jury improperly apportioned the church's fault for the teacher's criminal conduct. In this case parents sued after a teacher intentionally bumped their 1-year-old boy, knocking him to the ground, causing a head bump. The parents later determined this was not the first such abuse, of their child or others. Jurors awarded $100,000 in future mental-anguish damages and found the church was 80 percent responsible. The court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Medina and Justice Willett not sitting) 09-0530 Texas Department of Public Safety v. Cox Texas Newspapers L.P. and Hearst Newspapers L.L.C. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: David S. Morales, Austin For respondents: William Christian, Austin The principal issues in this dispute over state troopers' travel vouchers submitted for the governor's out-of-state trips are (1) whether a common-law exception to the Texas public information law excludes the vouchers' release, or should, when disclosure allegedly could cause physical harm; (2) whether DPS waived reliance on the Texas Homeland Security Act as an "other law" that would be an exception from the public information law's disclosure requirement; and, if not, (3) whether the vouchers are collected for preventing, detecting or investigating terrorism or related criminal activity. At least two Texas newspapers sued after DPS, with the attorney general's backing, refused to disclose individual troopers' travel vouchers for the governor's past out-of-state trips. DPS cited safety concerns for the governor and troopers and the attorney general, in an opinion DPS requested, determined the Texas Public Information Act did not require the vouchers' release. The trial court ruled the vouchers were not confidential and that disclosing them would not pose any imminent physical threat. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that evidence did not demonstrate substantial risk of harm even if a common-law privacy right could be grounded on such risk. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0420 Esperanza Andrade, Secretary of State v. NAACP of Austin, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Kristofer S. Monson, Austin For respondents: Tom Herman, Austin In this challenge to the secretary of state's electronic-voting-machine certification for Travis County's use, the principal issues are (1) whether the plaintiffs have standing by showing a concrete injury and, if so, (2) whether their allegations of election law and state constitutional violations waive sovereign immunity either under or for injunctive and declaratory relief against a state official acting without authority. In this case the NAACP, representing the voting rights of its Travis County members; a former attorney general candidate; and Travis County voters allege voting-rights violations because they contend the secretary of state certified electronic-voting machines that could not be audited. The trial court ruled all plaintiffs had standing and the court of appeals affirmed, with one dissent. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0002 Samuel T. Jackson v. State Office of Administrative Hearings from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Samuel T. Jackson, Arlington For respondents: Brenda Loudermilk, Austin The issue is whether the Public Information Act requires disclosure of license-revocation actions in child-support actions. Jackson sued for mandamus relief after the State Office of Administrative Hearings denied his request for all decisions, opinions or orders issued by the hearings agency in child support-enforcement matters in a certain three months. In a letter ruling, the attorney general agreed with the administrative hearings office that Texas Government Code section 552.101, together with Family Code section 231.108, renders the information confidential. The trial court denied Jackson's summary-judgment motion and granted the agency's. The appeals court affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0652 State of Texas v. Chris and Helen Petropoulos from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Susan Desmarais Bonnen, Austin For respondent: John McClish, Austin A principal issue is whether the trial court used the wrong condemnation-compensation test by instructing that damage should be calculated by taking the remainder property's value from the whole property's value before its taking. In this case the state appealed the trial court's judgment that $303,000 compensation was due property owners for one-third of an acre condemned for a highway project of the owners' 3.5-acre tract. The trial court accepted the state expert's valuation of the property after taking to be $276,000 and the jury's valuation finding for the whole tract before its taking to be slightly more than $579,000. The state argues that the property owners had not suffered a compensable loss. The appeals court affirmed the trial court's judgment. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0235 In re State of Texas from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For relator State of Texas: Ms. Susan Desmarais Bonnen, Austin For real parties in interest: Mr. Stephen I. Adler, Austin The issue is whether the trial court acted within its discretion by splitting a condemnation action into separate actions when the property owners subdivided the original tract after the original condemnation was filed. In this case the state challenged the trial court's decision to divide compensation claims into eight separate suits. The property owners who held the original parcel subdivided it in part, they claimed, to demonstrate its higher value. Special commissioners assigned to sort from competing valuations split the difference in appraised values, the new owners moved to split the claims from the commissioners' award, arguing that none was commonly owned and none of the eight tracts bordered another. The trial court granted the motions. The appeals court denied the state's petition to prevent the split claims. The state contends in part that dividing the claims was improper because subdivision occurred after the condemnation notice involving one tract and one set of owners. But the owners argue that the subdivision occurred before the state actually took the land - the date the state pays for the land - so assessing the value of eight tracts was proper. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0121 Finance Commission of Texas, et al. v. Valerie Norwood, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Mr. Evan S. Green and Mr. Craig Enoch, Austin For respondents: Mr. Nelson Mock, Austin Among principal issues in this challenge to regulations promulgated for home-equity lending in Texas are (1) whether deference should be the review standard for agency interpretations when the agencies - the Finance Commission and Credit Union Commission - were given power to interpret the constitutional home-equity provisions; (2) whether the two commissions erred by adopting the Finance Code's definition of "interest" for interpreting the constitutional provisions; and (3) whether the appeals court erred when it upheld agency rules that allow signing a home-equity loan by power of attorney instead of in specific locations set by the home-equity amendment. The trial court invalidated seven of nine challenged regulations. On review, the court of appeals held the standard of review should be the deference given to state-agency statutory interpretations. The appeals court affirmed the trial court in part and reversed and rendered judgment in part, holding the commissions' rules defining interest were contrary to the intent and plain meaning of the constitutional home-equity lending provision. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Hecht not sitting) 10-0374 Texas Department of Insurance v. American National Insurance Co. and American Life Insurance Co. of Texas from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals. Austin For petitioner: Arthur C. D'Andrea, Austin For respondent: Susan G. Conway, Austin The issue in this appeal from a declaratory judgment is whether stop-loss agreements involving self-funded insurance plans are direct insurance, subject to state regulation and certain fees, or reinsurance outside the state's regulation. Stop-loss policies are sold to cover self-funded plans for those occasions when the self-funded plan must pay a loss that exceeds an agreed-upon amount, called an "attachment point." The insurance department contends the companies issuing stop-loss policies sell direct insurance, subject to state regulation and to fees to the Texas Health Insurance Risk Pool. The trial court found for the department, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that stop-loss agreements constitute reinsurance outside the state insurance department's regulation. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0375 Atmos Energy Corp., et al. v. Cities of Allen, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners/cross-respondents companies: Ann M. Coffin and David Duggins, Austin For petitioners/cross-respondents cities: Jose E. de la Fuente, Austin For respondent Railroad Commission: Priscilla Hubenak, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the Texas Railroad Commission has appellate jurisdiction over the cities' denials of a utility's interim rate-increase filing and, if so, (2) whether the cities get a contested hearing for an interim-rate adjustment. In this case Allen and other cities sued for a declaratory judgment to void an administrative rule permitting interim rates for gas utilities' infrastructure improvements because the rule did not provide for a contested hearing. Allen and the other cities rejected the rate adjustments, but the Railroad Commission granted them without an evidentiary hearing. The trial court denied the cities' request that it declare the rule void, finding the cities could conduct a ministerial review of an interim rate increase but not otherwise deny it. The court of appeals affirmed that cities were not entitled to an adjudicatory hearing on an interim rate adjustment and held the Railroad Commission did not have appellate jurisdiction to review the cities' denial. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0426 Safeshred Inc. v. Louis Martinez III from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioner: Craig A. Morgan, Austin For respondent: Gregory D. Jordan, Austin Principal issues are (1) whether a Sabine Pilot wrongful-discharge claim can support a punitive-damages award, (2) whether sufficient evidence supported the jury's malice finding and, if so, (3) whether the punitive damages were constitutionally excessive. Martinez sued after Safeshred allegedly fired him for refusing to drive what he considered to be an unsafe truckload of steel shelving. His refusal followed previous occasions that he complained about load-safety issues and other regulatory-compliance matters with Safeshred trucks. A jury found his firing was retaliatory and awarded $250,000 in exemplary damages, along with lost wages and mental-anguish damages. The trial court applied the statutory exemplary-damages cap to reduce the award to $200,000. The court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0491 ?Hearts Bluff Game Ranch Inc. v. State of Texas and Texas Water Development Board? from Travis County and Third District Court of Appeals, Austin? For petitioner: Terry Jacobson, Corsicana? For respondents: Arthur C. D'Andrea, Austin ? The issue is whether an inverse-condemnation claim is proper against the state based on allegations the state acted to cause a federal agency to deny a wetlands-preservation permit in a area the state designated for a northeast Texas reservoir. In Hearts Bluff's lawsuit against the Texas Water Development Board, the company claimed the state lobbied the federal Army Corps of Engineers to deny Hearts Bluff Game Ranch a wetlands mitigation bank for property the company bought with assurance that the mitigation bank would be approved. The proposed mitigation area lay in an area proposed for a reservoir the state Legislature eventually approved. The state pleaded that the court did not have jurisdiction, based on sovereign immunity. The trial court denied the state's jurisdictional plea, but the appeals court reversed. In addition to the elements for an inverse-condemnation claim, the court held, Hearts Bluff must have established - and did not - that the water development agency effected the taking by a direct restriction resulting from its own regulatory power. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0316 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0683 and 10-0714 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0683 and 10-0714 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0666 City of Round Rock, et al. v. Jaime Rodriguez, et al. from Travis County and the Third District Court of Appeals, Austin For petitioners: Douglas W. Alexander, Austin For respondents: Craig Deats, Austin The issue is whether the Texas Labor Code provides public employees a right to have a union representative present at an investigative interview, that is, whether the Weingarten right applies to Texas labor law. Rodriguez sued to declare his right to have a union representative present when his supervisors interviewed him on a complaint that he misused sick leave. The city's fire chief denied his request for a union representative. Rodriguez argues that the Weingarten right, established for investigations under the National Labor Relations Act, should apply to similar proceedings under the Texas Labor Code because Weingarten established the right to have union representation on the rationale that the federal law protected employment, as does Texas labor law. The city contends Weingarten was decided more than 75 years after the applicable state labor law provision and the provision does not apply to public employees. The trial court decided in Rodriguez's favor and the court of appeals affirmed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

A principal issue in this libel case based on a television report that the Texas Medical Board ordered a physician disciplined is whether Texas recognizes the third party-allegation rule that would shield a publisher or broadcaster from defamation liability if the report is substantially true. Dr. Neely, an Austin neurologist, sued Wilson and her then-employer, KEYE-TV in Austin, after a report that included interviews with two malpractice claimants against Neely and a rendition of the medical board's agreed order with Neely. The order addressed the doctor's writing his own refill prescriptions for drugs in lieu of returning to the doctors who prescribed them. The order suspended him for three years, but allowed him to practice on probation with conditions and cited his violation of a rule prohibiting inappropriate prescriptions of "dangerous drugs" and his inability to practice medicine "with reasonable skill and safety to patients, due to mental or physical condition." The trial court granted summary judgment for Wilson and the station. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that McIlvain v. Jacobs created a third party-allegation rule in Texas and that Neely's allegations that the broadcast reported false defamatory statements were either substantially true or not defamatory.

The issues are (1) whether the operator of grab-it-if-you-can amusement machines is entitled to a sales- and use-tax refund for taxes paid for toys used in the machines falls under the statutory sale-for-resale exemption because the operator paid occupation tax on each machine and (2) whether the comptroller's interpretation of the statute should be given deference if the sale-for-resale exemption is ambiguous. In this case Roark sued for a refund of sales tax it paid for novelty prizes it stocks in its machines. To get the prize, players must manipulate a claw to pick it from a pile of similar toys--it will be chosen to go to a better place, as Buzz and Sheriff Woody arguably found not to be the case, if the player is successful. Roark argues that the sale-for-resale provision exempts it from paying sales tax on the toys because they are an integral part of the service for which it pays its occupational tax. The tax code provides that "tangible personal property" is not resold as part of the taxable service "unless care, custody, and control" of the toy in this case "is transferred to the purchaser of the service." The comptroller's administrative rules require that the sale-for-resale sales-tax exemption applies for amusement games like Roark's only if every player wins. The trial court ruled for the comptroller. The court of appeals held for Roark.

The issue is whether companies that sell prepaid wireless-telephone service must pay a statutory emergency-service fee the commission levied to finance a system that can locate a wireless 911 caller. Under the statute--Texas Health & Safety Code chapter 771, enacted in 1997--the fee applies to "each wireless telecommunications connection" but provides for collection of 50 cents each month from wireless subscribers who are billed by their providers. TracFone and Virgin Mobile, which sell airtime cards and do not bill purchasers monthly, paid the fees but sued for refunds, arguing that the statutory emergency-service fees do not apply to their products. A trial court overturned a commission order imposing the fees. The court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the statute required an emergency fee for every wireless connection regardless of how companies sold their services.

The issues in this case tests the operation of election-of-remedies provisions the Legislature added to the Texas Tort Claims Acts in 2003, asking in essence whether the negligence suit filed initially against the state-employee driver bars any suit against the state-agency itself when the driver shows he was driving as part of his job. In this case Ngakoue initially sued Barnum alone after an accident. Barnum then moved to dismiss the suit under section 101.106(f), contending his driving fell within the scope of his employment and the suit could have been filed against the Adjutant's General's Office. When Ngakoue amended her petition to add the state agency and to dismiss Barnum, the trial court refused to dismiss Barnum and denied the Adjutant General's Office's jurisdictional plea. Under section 101.106(b), the state argues, Ngakoue lost her chance to sue the state agency because she elected to sue the employee first by himself. The court of appeals denied the state's plea to the jurisdiction.

The principal issues are (1) whether the state, enjoined in an earlier appeal from how it calculated Medicaid reimbursements to the hospital district, must refigure reimbursement for the fiscal year before the injunction issued and (2) whether the trial court's injunction covering previous years was additional, retroactive relief beyond the Supreme Court's previous judgment and barred by sovereign immunity. In this case hospital districts challenged what they alleged was an invalid rule that limited the base calculation for Medicaid reimbursement rates. The districts argue in part that the Supreme Court's holding and injunction in an earlier appeal in this case requires the commission to recalculate rates going back several years because they were founded on a void rule. The commission counters that the injunction, in 2008, applied only prospectively. The trial court ordered rate recalculations for fiscal years back to 2002. The appeals court reversed for the years 2002 through 2007. After the trial court's ruling, an administrative law judge granted recalculated reimbursement for the 2010 fiscal year but determined no authority supported recalculation for previous years.

The issue is whether in a deceptive trade-practices action by the Attorney General's Office the DTPA's permissive-venue provision should take priority over the mandatory venue provided by the Civil Practices and Remedies Code. In this case, alleging gasoline marketers diluted octane ratings of gas they sold, the attorney general sued for an injunction in Travis County under a DTPA provision providing suits may be filed against defendants in a county in which they have "done business." Cook and the other retailers contend Travis County is an improper venue because the Civil Practices and Remedies Code mandates venue where defendants have their principal homes, or domiciles. The court of appeals denied Cook's petition for mandamus relief after the trial court ruled the suit was proper in Travis County.

Consolidated for oral argument with 11-0652. A principal issue in these challenges for tax refunds is whether a government contractor purchasing personal property and services to meet its contract obligations qualifies for the sale-for-resale sales-tax exemption under Tax Code section 151.006(a)(1). Health Care Services Corp. sued after the comptroller refused to refund all sales tax the company paid for property that, under its contracts with the federal government, the federal government would own. The comptroller argues that the sale-for-resale exemption excludes sales taxes paid for a non-taxable services. On the other hand Health Care Service Corp. contends the "resale" occurred when title passed to the government. In both cases, involving two periods, the trial court ordered the state to refund sales taxes on all categories of property the company paid. The appeals court affirmed.

Consolidated for oral argument with 11-0283. A principal issue in these challenges for tax refunds is whether a government contractor purchasing personal property and services to meet its contract obligations qualifies for the sale-for-resale sales-tax exemption under Tax Code section 151.006(a)(1). Health Care Services Corp. sued after the comptroller refused to refund all sales tax the company paid for property that, under its contracts with the federal government, the federal government would own. The comptroller argues that the sale-for-resale exemption excludes sales taxes paid for a non-taxable services. On the other hand Health Care Service Corp. contends the "resale" occurred when title passed to the government. In both cases, involving two periods, the trial court ordered the state to refund sales taxes on all categories of property the company paid. The appeals court affirmed.

Consilidated for oral argument with 11-0737. In these cases the principal issue is whether the city and the Bosque River Coalition were entitled to contested-case hearings challenging amended water-quality permits allowing larger herds at dairies in the Bosque River watershed. In the Waco case the city objects to animal waste from one of the dairies polluting the drinking water it draws from Lake Waco downstream. The Bosque River Coalition, a non-profit environmental-protection group, alleges that landowners downstream from the other dairy would suffer pollution from dairy-cattle waste runoff. The underlying question in both cases is whether the Commission on Environmental Quality properly determined that neither the city nor the coalition was an "affected person" entitled to contested-case hearings challenging the commission's permit approvals. Waco and the coalition argue that determining status as an affected person is determining standing and must be, on disputed facts, decided in a contested hearing. The commission determined that the city was too remote from the dairy to show a legally sufficient interest to contest the permit and that the landowners' property was not close enough to allege injuries more particular than injuries the general public might suffer. The commission argues that its affected-person determinations should be reviewed by substantial evidence and not, as the city and coalition contend, under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Both Waco and the coalition counter that the commission's conclusion that the dairies' amended water permits would be more protective of water quality than the original permits was irrelevant - thus arbitrary - to determinations that the city and coalition were not affected persons. Trial courts in each case affirmed the commission's orders approving the amended water permits, but the court of appeals reversed each, agreeing that the commission acted arbitrarily and holding in part that a substantial-evidence review was inapplicable because neither the city nor the coalition had a chance to develop an evidentiary record in a contested hearing.

Consilidated for oral argument with 11-0729. In these cases the principal issue is whether the city and the Bosque River Coalition were entitled to contested-case hearings challenging amended water-quality permits allowing larger herds at dairies in the Bosque River watershed. In the Waco case the city objects to animal waste from one of the dairies polluting the drinking water it draws from Lake Waco downstream. The Bosque River Coalition, a non-profit environmental-protection group, alleges that landowners downstream from the other dairy would suffer pollution from dairy-cattle waste runoff. The underlying question in both cases is whether the Commission on Environmental Quality properly determined that neither the city nor the coalition was an "affected person" entitled to contested-case hearings challenging the commission's permit approvals. Waco and the coalition argue that determining status as an affected person is determining standing and must be, on disputed facts, decided in a contested hearing. The commission determined that the city was too remote from the dairy to show a legally sufficient interest to contest the permit and that the landowners' property was not close enough to allege injuries more particular than injuries the general public might suffer. The commission argues that its affected-person determinations should be reviewed by substantial evidence and not, as the city and coalition contend, under an arbitrary-and-capricious standard. Both Waco and the coalition counter that the commission's conclusion that the dairies' amended water permits would be more protective of water quality than the original permits was irrelevant - thus arbitrary - to determinations that the city and coalition were not affected persons. Trial courts in each case affirmed the commission's orders approving the amended water permits, but the court of appeals reversed each, agreeing that the commission acted arbitrarily and holding in part that a substantial-evidence review was inapplicable because neither the city nor the coalition had a chance to develop an evidentiary record in a contested hearing.

A principal issue in this challenge to the Texas Railroad Commission's approval for CenterPoint's annual cost-of-service adjustment is whether the Gas Utilities Regulation Act gives the commission power to adjust rates either under its broad rate authority or by its implied authority to approve interim-rate adjustments to protect against "regulatory lag." In this case nine municipalities and state-agency customers in CenterPoint's Texas Coast Division protested the gas utility's rate increase, arguing the Railroad Commission has authority only to approve such rate adjustments by full rate cases, not by a formula that allows annual rate adjustments. The coalition and state agencies argue that the Gas Utilities Regulation Act contains safeguards that allow for rates to rise while full rate cases are decided, answering the implied authority to protect against so-called regulatory lag. In an appeal to district court from the commission's order, the court held the commission acted without authority by approving the rate increase. The appeals court reversed, determining that the commission had such rate-adjustment power under the regulation statute's' broad authority or implied power.

Consolidated for oral argument with 11-0024 and 11-0222. The essential question is whether a same-sex couple married legally in another state may be legally divorced by a Texas court despite the state's statutory and constitutional prohibition against such marriages in Texas. And if the Texas marriage prohibition extends to prohibit divorce, then does that violate the U.S. Constitution? These cases, involving divorces granted in Dallas County (two married men) and in Travis County (married women), raise these procedural issues: (1) whether a Texas trial court has jurisdiction over a no-fault same-sex divorce; (2) whether the state may intervene to contest the trial court's jurisdiction to grant the divorce; and, if not, (3) whether the state may challenge the trial court's judgment by a mandamus petition contesting the trial court's jurisdiction.

Consolidated for oral argument with 11-0024 and 11-0114. The essential question is whether a same-sex couple married legally in another state may be legally divorced by a Texas court despite the state's statutory and constitutional prohibition against such marriages in Texas. And if the Texas marriage prohibition extends to prohibit divorce, then does that violate the U.S. Constitution? These cases, involving divorces granted in Dallas County (two married men) and in Travis County (married women), raise these procedural issues: (1) whether a Texas trial court has jurisdiction over a no-fault same-sex divorce; (2) whether the state may intervene to contest the trial court's jurisdiction to grant the divorce; and, if not, (3) whether the state may challenge the trial court's judgment by a mandamus petition contesting the trial court's jurisdiction.

The principal issues in this defamation case are (1) whether a for-profit company's reputation damages are economic damages for purposes of the statutory cap on exemplary awards; (2) whether support was legally sufficient for a $5-million reputation-damage award; and (3) whether that award violated First Amendment restrictions on defamation damages. In this case Texas Disposal Systems sued after a community "action alert" Waste Management anonymously issued while the two companies were competing for waste-disposal and landfill contracts with Austin and San Antonio. Texas Disposal alleged Waste Management falsely claimed that Texas Disposal's landfill did not protective against pollution as well as other landfills. A jury found the alert's statements deliberately false and awarded $5 million to Texas Disposal for reputational damage and added $20 million for exemplary damages. But the trial court ruled the reputational damages were non-economic damages and reduced the punitive award to $1.65 million, following punitive-damage limits based on non-economic damage awards. The appeals court affirmed.

The principal issues in this defamation appeal are (1) whether the Texas Constitution's free-speech provision imposes a stricter standard on injunctive relief than the First Amendment and (2) whether a permanent injunction constitutes a prior restraint under one or the other free-speech guarantees, or both. In this case Kinney, one of Barnes's former employees in a lawyer search-and-placement firm who left to start his own legal-recruiting firm, sued over a statement Barnes posted on two websites that accused Kinney of paying kickbacks to place clients. In his suit Kinney sought a permanent injunction as his only remedy, to force Barnes to take the statement off his websites. The trial court granted Barnes's summary-judgment motion that the injunction would be a prior restraint. The appeals court affirmed.

The principal issues are (1) whether this challenge under the Texas Constitution's due-course-of-law provision should be analyzed under a "real and substantial connection" test and not, as federal due-process-of-law claims, by a rational basis; (2) whether the state has immunity from declaratory-judgment claims raising constitutional challenges to statutes; and (3) whether the suit is justiciable because all plaintiffs may not have standing to challenge the licensing requirement, or the suit may not be ripe because only two of the plaintiffs face penalties for not being licensed or it may be barred by the redundant-remedies doctrine. In this case several "eyebrow threaders" and salon owners who offer threading sued the department, the commission over it and officers of both over regulations that require eyebrow threaders to be licensed facialists or cosmetologists. To be licensed, the threaders complain, involves either 750 or 1,500 hours' training that has little to do with their work. Patel and another eyebrow threader who worked at a mall kiosk, as Patel did, were cited by state inspectors for working without licenses. Together with other eyebrow-threading practitioners and the salon owners, they sued to declare the license requirement unconstitutional as it applied to them. The state responded by arguing that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, being essentially a claim that department officers exceeded their authority. The trial court ruled that the department and the commission did not have immunity but granted summary judgment for the state on the merits. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the eyebrow threaders had standing and their claims were ripe, but the regulation was constitutional as applied to Patel and the others.

The issue in this mandamus action is whether a trial court properly denied a government agency its effort to supersede the court's judgment when it filed an appeal notice. In the underlying case the board brought disciplinary action against a high-school teacher acquitted of felony charges that he maintained improper relationships with students. An administrative-law judge recommended no discipline against the teacher, the school's track coach, but issued findings detailing suspect behavior, including the teacher giving female student athletes rub downs instead of referring them to the athletic trainer, allowing unsupervised students to come to his home and to use his whirlpool baths and calling one student as many as 480 times, that the administrative judge concluded did not support sexual abuse or assault or a romantic relationship. The teacher-certification board rejected the no-discipline recommendation and revoked the teacher's certificate. On appeal the trial court reversed the board and permanently enjoined it from revoking the teacher's certificate or from considering it revoked. The board then filed its appeal notice and brought this mandamus petition when the trial court refused the board's effort to post a bond to supersede the judgment. The court of appeals denied the board mandamus relief.

Consolidated for oral argument with 14-0122. The state sued Life Partners for securities fraud, but the trial court concluded the state failed to establish the contracts were securities subject to the act. The Austin Court of Appeals reversed, agreeing with the Dallas appeals court that the life settlements were investment contracts.

The principal issues in this contest to get the price Boeing paid for maintenance facilities at the former Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio are (1) whether lease information is exempt from public disclosure under Texas Public Information Act section 552.104 (protecting information that would give advantage to a competitor) and (2) whether the information falls under section 552.110's trade-secrets exemption. A former Boeing employee requested the lease information from the Kelly development entity. Boeing sued the attorney general after the attorney general, in an opinion Boeing requested, determined that Boeing's leasing costs for the Kelly space was subject to disclosure under the open-records law. The trial court agreed and the appeals court affirmed its decision. Boeing argues that its military aircraft-maintenance business, the reason it leased former maintenance hangars at Kelly, is highly competitive, so by knowing what it paid for the Kelly lease its competitors could bid for cheaper facilities elsewhere and underbid Boeing for military contracts. The attorney general contends that section 552.104's exemption for information benefitting a competitor protects the government's interests, not a private company's, and that Boeing did not prove the information it was seeking to protect was a trade secret exempted by section 552.110.

The principal issue is whether a non-profit group contracting with the city for economic-development services is subject to Texas' open-records law. Greater Houston Partnership, which is financed in part by Houston, sued the attorney general over a ruling that the partnership's check records must be disclosed under Texas' Public Information Act. Under its contract with Houston, the Greater Houston Partnership among other tasks had responsibility for executing the mayor's 10-year strategic-development plan and coordinating the city's congressional and legislative efforts and had authority to contract for the city. The partnership and the attorney general center their arguments on the statute's definition of a governmental body as one "supported in whole or in part by public funds" and whether how much support is enough should be determined by the so-called Kneeland test devised by the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. Employing the Kneeland analysis, the trial court ruled the statute defines the partnership as a governmental body. A divided court of appeals affirmed.

In this accommodations challenge by deaf prison inmates the issues are (1) whether prisons are "public facilities" under the state Human Resources Code and, if so, (2) whether the department acted without authority by refusing requested disability accommodations. Beeman and Lock sued for ready access to teletypewriters (which, unlike telephones available to hearing inmates, are locked and must be requested), videophones (so deaf inmates can use American Sign Language to communicate without delays inherent in teletypewriter communications) and sign-language interpreters for prison programs such as classes provided by a school district. The trial court ordered the prison system to provide access to videophones for its deaf inmates and qualified interpreters for certain programs. Determining that prisons are not public facilities for required accommodations, the appeals court dismissed the prisoners' claims for lacking subject-matter jurisdiction.

Among the principal issues:

Whether the district court correctly denied the state's request to dismiss the constitutional claims on grounds that they are not capable of judicial resolution, the plaintiffs do not have standing to bring them and the claims are not ripe. The state argues in essence that financing schools is a policy consideration reserved to the Legislature and, even if the claims are justiciable, the school-district plaintiffs by seeking to enjoin the state from operating an unconstitutional public-school system do not have standing and the claims are not ripe because the Legislature has constructed a more-demanding system that is only in its beginning stages and cannot be evaluated yet.

Whether the school-finance system is inadequate as a whole under the state constitution's Article VII, section 1 adequacy requirement and particularly whether it provides adequately for educating so-called English language learners - ELL students - and economically disadvantaged students. The state responds that the trial court's inadequacy ruling is based on financial "inputs" and not student performance - outputs - the standard it argues the Court has used in previous school-finance cases to evaluate adequacy.

Whether the state's school system is constitutionally unsuitable under Article VII, section 1's suitability requirement. In response the state argues that suitability, the means to achieve a constitutionally adequate school system, is satisfied if the system is adequate. But the school-district plaintiffs contend an adequate school system can be unsuitable if the state fails to finance it sufficiently to meet the state's educational goals - they insist funding is not sufficient - and by the state's alleged failure to calculate the costs of providing an adequate education.

Whether the school system fails the constitutional requirement that it be financially efficient. The state maintains that the gap between what so-called property-poor districts can raise by taxes and what property-wealthy districts raise has narrowed from when the Court held in the last school-finance decision that the school system was efficient.

Whether the trial court erred by rejecting charter schools' particular claims that their state financing is inadequate, unsuitable and inefficient and that the state's provision for charters is unequal, relative to public schools'.

Whether the trial court erred by denying intervenors' claims that the school system is "qualitatively" inefficient - that is, they argue among other factors, that mandated class sizes, limits on available charter schools and state teacher certifications breed waste, limit competition and further inefficiency.

Whether the state's school-finance scheme imposes an unconstitutional statewide property tax. The standard for a statewide ad valorem tax, as the Court determined in the last school-finance decision, is whether essentially the state imposes a tax "cap" that leaves school districts with no meaningful discretion in raising and spending money.

The principal issue is whether an extension cord strung across a university sidewalk constitutes a premises defect instead of negligent use of tangible personal property. Sampson, a law professor, sued the university for injuries he suffered when he tripped in the dark over a cord across a sidewalk between the law school and a parking lot. The cord, which Sampson alleged was not taped to the sidewalk, had been used by tailgaters. The university filed a jurisdictional plea, moving to dismiss Sampson's claim or for summary judgment on it, arguing the Texas Tort Claims Act did not give the trial court jurisdiction to decide Sampson's claim because it was for a premises defect. In part UT presented evidence that the extension cord was not the university's and UT had no knowledge of it. Sampson's evidence included affidavits that UT generally provided power for a private rental company's tailgating patrons. The trial court denied the university's plea. The court of appeals reversed.

The issue is whether taxing cigarette manufacturers that are not parties to the 1998 Texas tobacco settlement but not taxing cigarette-makers covered by the agreement violates the state Constitution's equal-and-uniform clause. In this case the tobacco companies sued for federal and state constitutional violations because the Legislature in 2013 created a tax on tobacco products sold by companies that were not part of the 1998 settlement. Unlike other states that settled with the tobacco companies, Texas never established escrow accounts into which non-settling tobacco manufacturers had to pay to credit against future recoveries. The trial court ruled the 2013 tax unconstitutional. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that tax violated the state constitution's equal-and-uniform clause.

In this tax-protest case the issue is whether Hallmark was obligated to include a net loss from sale of an investment asset when it reported its companywide gross receipts in calculating its Texas franchise tax. The comptroller alleges Hallmark underpaid by close to $200,000 its franchise tax for 2008 because it did not include in its calculations a $628 million loss on investments that the company deducted on its federal taxes. By failing to include the loss, Hallmark's gross receipts reported to Texas were greater that the comptroller believes they should have been and, as the comptroller argues, because those receipts are divided by what Hallmark sold in Texas its franchise-tax calculation was smaller than it should have been. But Hallmark argues that the franchise-tax law requires it specifically to include in its gross receipts only a net gain from an investment or capital-asset sale, not a loss. The appeals court held the comptroller's interpretation was reasonable.

The issue is whether Linegar has standing to sue for legal malpractice and related claims if his only injury was losing his retirement money held by a corporate trustee. This case involves a temporary loan that Linegar, as chair, director and sole shareholder of the corporate trustee holding his retirement fund, authorized from the retirement fund to a company in which he was the largest shareholder. That company, IdentiPHI Inc., resulted from a merger between a company Linegar controlled and a Seattle company. Linegar alleges DLA Piper, which represented the Seattle company in the merger and became the new company's counsel, later represented him in the details of the temporary financing for the new company. Linegar claims, however, that DLA Piper failed to secure the loan properly and, when the new company declared bankruptcy, his retirement fund was his direct loss, not the corporate trustee's, and his alleged malpractice claim arose from DLA Piper's advice to him. After a jury trial, the trial court awarded Linegar the retirement fund's value and other damages. The appeals court reversed, holding that Linegar did not have standing to sue as a shareholder because the loan was from the corporate trustee.

One issue in Nationwide's effort to enforce a forum-selection clause, stipulating suit in Ohio, is whether the company substantially invoked Texas courts by litigating for close to two years. In this case Brian Besch, a Nationwide insurance agent, sued Nationwide in Texas for canceling an agreement by which he would get policies a retired agent had handled. Besch filed suit in Travis County despite the forum-selection clause that disputes over the agreement must be filed in Ohio. For two years Nationwide filed discovery requests (depositions were not taken); moved for dismissal on the merits (none decided); filed counterclaims; and filed special exceptions that, after they were granted, led Besch to re-plead his claims. If by doing all that Nationwide substantially invoked the judicial process in Texas, then a second issue is whether Besch suffered sufficient prejudice to avoid the agreed forum. Besch contends he has, because limitations now could bar his suit in Ohio. Nationwide argues Besch is not prejudiced because he chose to bring suit in Texas, despite the forum agreement, and it has agreed to forfeit its limitations defense if the lawsuit is moved to Ohio. The trial court denied Nationwide's effort to enforce the forum clause, ruling the company substantially used Texas courts to Besch's detriment, citing Perry Homes v. Cull for its holding that plaintiffs' extensive litigation waived their efforts to invoke an arbitration agreement just before trial. The court of appeals denied Nationwide's request for mandamus relief.

The issue in this tax-refund case is whether an oil-and-gas producer is exempt as a manufacturer from sales tax paid for below-ground equipment used to extract minerals. Southwest sued after the comptroller denied its tax-refund claim for purchases for "downhole" equipment under a provision exempting sales tax on equipment used or consumed during "actual manufacturing, processing, or fabrication." Initially the trial court ruled for Southwest, but on reconsideration decided for the state that below-ground equipment did not, as required for the manufacturing sales-tax exemption, directly cause a physical or chemical change in the extracted hydrocarbons. In its review the appeals court affirmed, holding the comptroller's statutory interpretation not "plainly erroneous or inconsistent" with statutory language establishing the exemption. In this Court Southwest argues that its downhole equipment separates hydrocarbons into oil, gas and condensates--at that point, personal property from what had been real property--which constitutes processing as the statute defines it. The comptroller contends that processing must be read as a part of manufacturing and that mineral extraction, under the statute, cannot be manufacturing.

In this challenge to disciplinary action by Texas against a Texas pharmacist by another state where she is licensed, the issue is whether the Texas pharmacy board's unwritten policy to follow the other state's suspension and sanction constitutes an invalid rule. The appeals court held against the pharmacy board for its imposed sanction against Witcher, requiring her to comply with North Carolina's discipline to regain her license in Texas. North Carolina suspended her license for her failure to comply with monitoring for substance-abuse problems that arose there after her husband died in a car accident within weeks of their marriage in 2007. Without a job and after she lost her house in foreclosure, Witcher returned to Texas and volunteered for the Texas board's substance-abuse rehabilitation program, entered therapy and resumed pharmacy practice. The Texas board then moved to suspend her, pending North Carolina's resolution of her case. Texas argues it imposed a rule requiring reciprocal discipline for matters, like substance abuse, that Texas would enforce in Texas. But Witcher claims that reciprocal rule, being unwritten, violates the Administrative Procedure Act and its imposition against her is arbitrary and capricious.

In this appeal from the appeals court's dismissal based on the acceptance-of-benefits doctrine, the issues are (1) whether the appeals court properly dismissed an appeal challenging a divorce decree because the ex-wife accepted rental income from properties she got in the divorce and, if so, (2) whether issues unrelated to property division may be severed and appealed.

The issues are (1) whether Texas Utilities Code section 36.351 requires Oncor to provide a 20-percent discount to state universities and colleges; (2) whether Oncor may pass to ratepayers additional franchise fees negotiated with cities in its service area; and (3) whether Oncor is a member of an "affiliated group eligible to file a consolidated income tax return" under former Utilities Code section 36.060(a).

The issues in this public-information case are (1) whether the attorney-client privilege may be asserted under Public Information Act sections 552.101 or 552.107(1), or both; (2) whether attorney-client privilege constitutes a compelling reason to withhold requested public documents under section 552.302; and (3) whether avoiding harm to the city's bargaining position in a multimillion-dollar long-term transaction to without requested information.

The issue is whether Texas's bar against a retail alcohol-sales permit-holder having ownership in an alcohol-beverage manufacturer operates to keep Mexican convenience-store operator Cardena from selling beer and wine in Texas stores it plans. Cardena is owned by a Mexican holding company that in turn owns through subsidiaries a 20 percent stake in a European brewer and its holding company.

The issue is whether the examining board's rule that therapists it regulates may do "diagnostic assessments" exceeds the board's authority under an enabling statute that only authorizes marriage and family therapists to make "evaluations".

In this case, involving an insurance-financing agreement by which the financing company terminated the insured's policy for chronic late payments, the issues are (1) whether BankDirect's statutory obligation to give 10 days' notice before canceling the policy was substantially completed when the notice was sent nine days before its effective date and (2) whether the power-of-attorney agreement BankDirect used to cancel the policy should be strictly construed.

In this suit by a University of Texas regent seeking access to student-admissions records, the principal issues are (1) whether the regent, Hall, pleaded a valid claim against the university chancellor for acting without authority in denying the requested records and (2) whether an individual regent has a right to otherwise confidential student records.

The principal issue in this challenge to Texas's limits on corporate campaign contributions is whether the ban on such contributions is unconstitutional on its face under Citizens United v. FEC.

The issue is whether Texas's franchise tax is an income tax as defined by the Multistate Tax Compact (Texas Tax Code chapter 141) allowing Graphic, a Georgia company, to file under chapter 141 instead of the margin tax formula established by chapter 171.

The principal issue is whether Texas should recognize tortious interference with inheritance rights.

The principal issue is whether the trial court properly dismissed a suit under procedural Rule 91a against the commission, on notice that the suit was filed, because the plaintiff failed to effect service within 90 days.

The principal issue is whether remedies the state seeks for Medicaid fraud should be considered damages subject to proportionate-responsibility calculations.

Principal issues are (1) whether minimum fines to enforce an order to contain groundwater contamination against a limited-liability company and its sole member, based on judgments against both, are unconstitutionally excessive and (2) whether the state can hold both the company and its sole employee liable when the statute forbids a "person" from violating the state water code when the state alleges violations by both.

The issues in this challenge to the state's revocation of school charters are (1) whether charter schools have a constitutionally protected interest in their charters; (2) whether the state's revocations were based on an unconstitutionally retroactive statute; and (3) whether sovereign immunity bars the charter schools' claims the education commissioner acted without authority because those claims seek retroactive relief.

The issue is whether counterclaims to an enforcement action under the Texas Medicaid and Fraud Prevention Act are barred by sovereign immunity.

Principal issues are (1) whether a rehearing motion was required, under administrative procedures, before judicial review of an administrative-law judge's order placing Mosley on a registry of residential-care workers determined to have abused patients and, if so, (2) whether the notice to her that the order was subject to judicial review was sufficiently misleading that it violated due process.

In this case challenging sanctions against a physician, for not electronically signing and submitting a death certificate to a state database, the principal issues are (1) whether the medical board exaggerated Aleman's failure to follow database procedures as unprofessional or dishonorable conduct and (2) whether the medical board acted arbitrarily and capriciously by sanctioning the doctor for conduct the administrative-law judge determined was impossible because Aleman was not yet registered to access the state database.

In this contest over a lease by the navigation district to the oyster-production company, to use submerged land to grow and harvest oysters, the issues are (1) whether statute overcomes the district's governmental immunity claim; (2) whether the district commissioners have authority to lease the land in this case; (3) whether the state properly alleged an ultra-vires claim against the commissioners for restitution; and (4) whether Sustainable Texas Oyster Resources has standing in this appeal.

17-0404

The issue is whether the state, to resist disclosure of a pharmacy supplying execution drugs for Texas prisons, must show under the state's open-records law that the threat-of-physical-harm exception to disclosure means more likely than not to result in physical harm.

The principal issues in this case alleging CPS, the San Antonio municipal utility, discriminated against cable company Time Warner by charging it "pole attachment" fees higher than it charged telecommunications provider AT&T are (1) whether the applicable Public Utilities Regulation Act provision applies to Time Warner as a franchised cable company and (2) whether the appeals court erred by determining CPS did not violate the utility-regulation act's provisions against discriminatory charges.

The issue is whether the environmental-quality commission has authority under the Tax Code to determine pollution-control tax breaks for businesses that use heat-recovery steam generators.

The issue, as in 17-1003, is whether the commission has authority under the Tax Code to determine pollution-control tax breaks for businesses that use heat-recovery steam generators.

The issue in this defamation action against entertainment program TMZ by a former Dallas Cowboys linebacker is whether a failure to request a correction or retraction under the Defamation Mitigation Act requires dismissal.

The issue is whether the Texas franchise-tax law (Tax Code section 171.1012) allows a company leasing heavy construction equipment to deduct from its franchise taxes its costs to deliver equipment and retrieve it from customers.

In this franchise-tax challenge the overriding issue is whether a movie theater's expenses to show films can be deducted as costs of goods sold under Tax Code section 171.1012.

The issues in this dispute over franchise taxes are (1) whether Gulf Copper's services, as an offshore rig-repair company, allow it to claim subcontractor pass-through exemptions either in connection with real-property improvements or for payments to a subcontractor and (2) whether Gulf Copper is entitled to include labor costs for services not directly related to manufacturing goods as a cost-of-goods-sold deduction.

The issues are in this class-action fraud case, identical to those in 17-1010, above, are (1) whether GTECH, an independent contractor supervised by the Texas Lottery Commission, is protected by the commission's sovereign immunity and (2) whether evidence that GTECH's liability will result in spending public money necessary to extend the contractor's derivative immunity. In this case, different from the ruling in Nettles, the appeals court held GTECH did not have derivative immunity.

The issues in this franchise-tax protest are (1) whether amended Tax Code section 112.108, allowing a taxpayer by oath to forgo prepaying the tax owed, is an unconstitutional barrier to open courts; (2) whether, if unconstitutional, section 112.108 nonetheless waives the state's immunity from statutory remedies (or, if not, whether taxpayers are limited to common-law remedies 112.108 intended to replace); and, assuming constitutionality, (3) whether EBS Solutions’s oath that it could not prepay taxes is legally sufficient.

The principal issues in this specific-jurisdiction case are (1) whether the company's contract sales representative's online LinkedIn profile, admitted to show his relationship to the defendant, was inadmissible hearsay; (2) whether the court of appeals erred by analyzing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court to determine specific jurisdiction does not exist; and (3) whether the appeals court erred by failing to analyze a "stream-of-commerce-plus" theory to find that specific jurisdiction does not exist.

Among principal issues arising from the San Jacinto River Authority's request for expedited declaration that its water rates to secure bonds are valid: (1) whether the Expedited Declaratory Judgment Act allows the river authority to seek the declarations it seeks in this case; (2) whether the act's procedures violate due process; (3) whether the declarations concern public or private rights; (4) whether the cities may contest the act's constitutionality; and (5) whether the cities are immune from this declaratory action.

The issues in this franchise-tax dispute, by a defense contractor protesting assessed taxes for fighter jets the Defense Department ordered for foreign countries, are (1) whether the aircraft buyer was the U.S. government and delivery was in Fort Worth and (2) whether under the appropriate statute to determine the sales source requires a delivery-location test or a buyer-location test.

The issues in this challenge by an air-ambulance company to workers-compensation rates for its service are (1) whether the federal Airline Deregulation Act preempts the Texas Workers' Compensation Act's reimbursement schedule for air-ambulance service; if so, (2) whether the federal McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes such preemption; and, if the Airline Deregulation Act preempts the workers-comp rates, (3) whether it preempts the workers-comp law's prohibition against "balance billing" that would bar the air-ambulance company from charging the patient the difference between what the workers-comp law pays and the ambulance company's charge.

The issues in this challenge by the Texas Medical Association to certain rules for chiropractic practice are (1) whether the chiropractic scope-of-practice rule that provides for chiropractors to "diagnose" exceeds the Board of Chiropractor Examiners' statutory authority; (2) whether a rule allowing chiropractors to diagnose patients' balance problems exceeds the Board of Chiropractor Examiners' statutory authority; and (3) whether the Texas Medical Association has standing to challenge the chiropractic-practice rules.

In this case by a medical provider that initially challenged an insurer's workers-compensation medical-procedure reimbursement, a principal issue is whether the insurer shoulders the proof burden in contesting a workers-comp decision before the State Office of Administrative Hearings.

In this challenge by the Houston Independent School District of the Texas Education Agency's effort to remove the existing school board, the issues are (1) whether the appeals court has discretion to issue temporary orders that effectively deny the state its right to supersede the trial court's order and (2) whether the agency has satisfied the requirements for mandamus relief.

The issues in this challenge to city ordinances arguably preempted by powers delegated to the Texas Railroad Commission are (1) whether Texas Propane Gas Association has standing to challenge all Houston's regulations on liquified-natural gas operations; (2) whether the trial court, sitting as a civil court, lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of local ordinances that ostensibly are penal by nature; and, assuming they are, (3) whether a civil court can declare the regulations unconstitutional under its equitable powers.

The issues are (1) whether Lara pleaded facts in his failure-to-accommodate claim that would waive the state's sovereign immunity under the Texas Commission of Human Rights Act; (2) whether a request for reasonable accommodation qualifies as protected activity under Texas's anti-retaliation statute to waive the department's sovereign immunity; and (3) whether for trial Lara pleaded a disability-discrimination claim.

In this utility-rate case, challenging the Public Utility Commission's allowance for costs spent on a coal-fired power plant, the issues are (1) whether the court of appeals properly construed the prudence standard for calculating costs to include in the utility's rate base and (2) whether the appeals court failed to consider whether the commission properly allowed the company to recover its construction spending for the plant.

The issues in this challenge to a municipal utility's rates are (1) whether Data Foundry, as a city-owned utility customer, has standing under the Public Utility Regulatory Act to challenge alleged excessive or discriminatory rates the city utility charges and (2) whether Austin's purported exclusive jurisdiction forbids judicial review of Data Foundry's common-law or constitutional rights, or both.

In this challenge by Dallas teachers over the effects of a new district evaluation process the issues are (1) whether the appeals court erred by determining the commissioner had jurisdiction over the teachers' appeal because their grievance was filed on time; (2) whether the appeals court erred by holding that the teachers' appraisal grievances and grievances based on the district's new evaluation components were filed on time; and (3) whether the appeals courts erred by finding the teachers' exceptions to the administrative-law judge's proposal for decision inadequate to preserve error on allegations that the teachers' pay was reduced by higher insurance costs at a time when they could not resign without penalty.

The issues in this challenge to the Health and Human Services commissioner and inspector general's refusal to provide a contested-case hearing on an audit under the vendor drug program are (1) whether the challenger's request for findings and conclusions extended the deadline to appeal and thus preserved appellate jurisdiction and (2) whether McNeill was entitled to a contested-case hearing.

The issues are (1) whether jurisdictional discovery in a special-appearance proceeding under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a extends to both the jurisdictional issues and the merits; (2) whether deposition topics the appeals court struck address jurisdictional issues; and (3) whether mandamus relief is appropriate.

The issues in this case by a physician whose medical license was first "restricted" after patient allegations against him is (1) whether under state law the Texas Medical Board has a ministerial duty to rectify its report to a national database when a final order removed the license restriction as "voiding" the temporary order restricting the medical license and (2) whether the Medical Board has a ministerial duty to file a "void report" in contrast to a "revision-to-action" report following a final order dismissing all allegations against the physician.

The issues are (1) whether the appeals court erred by finding the governing board of the Texas Civil Commitment Office, the agency responsible for treatment of sexually violent predator, has rulemaking authority; (2) whether the appeals court erred by finding Matzen's claims barred by sovereign immunity; (3) whether the appeals court erred by finding McLane's acts within the scope of her lawful authority; (4) whether Matzen alleged a viable claim that the Civil Commitment Office's cost-recovery efforts violate his constitutional rights to procedural due process and due course of law; and (5) whether Matzen alleged a viable claim that the Civil Commitment Office's cost-recovery efforts unconstitutionally took his property for public use without just compensation.

In this challenge to a Texas Commission on Environmental Quality wastewater-discharge permit for a coal mine the issues are (1) whether the commission's "operator" definition, establishing Dos Republicas Coal Partnership as operator instead of owner, is entitled to deference; (2) whether Dos Republicas Coal Partnership is the mine operator instead of its contractor, Camino Real Fuels; and (3) whether the appeals court violated the substantial-evidence standard when it reversed the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's determination that Dos Republicas was the "operator" of the mine.

In this franchise tax dispute involving the transmission of satellite radio to Texas customers, the primary issue is whether the test to determine if a service has been performed in Texas should be based on where the "receipt-producing, end-product act is done."

The issue in this case is whether a formerly incarcerated individual is entitled to compensation for wrongful imprisonment under the Tim Cole Act.

The principal issue in this case is whether the rescission of a Railroad Commission (RRC) no-harm letter before Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) granted an injection-well permit rendered the application deficient or void at its issuance.

This tax dispute centers on the classification of stop-loss insurance issued to employers with self-funded health benefit plans. Health Care Service Corporation, d/b/a Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Texas (BCBS) offers stop-loss insurance policies to employers that self-fund their employee's health benefit plans. Because employee

This direct appeal arises from a final judgment in a suit challenging the constitutionality of a statute and related agency rule that prohibit the production of consumable hemp products for smoking.

This direct appeal arises from two suits challenging the constitutionality of the Legislature's recent reapportionment of the State's senatorial and representative districts based on the 2020 census. The suits were transferred to and consolidated before a special three-judge district court under Chapter 22A of the Government Code. In the direct appeal, the State parties

These cases address whether public universities can revoke degrees of former students.

The issues presented in this case are (1) whether absent class members lack standing to seek civil penalties for 176 alleged violations of the Texas Property Code and (2) whether the court of appeals was required to determine and evaluate the specific elements for the causes of action raised by the class.

The issues in this case are (1) whether Mike Morath, commissioner of the Texas Education Agency, acted ultra vires by appointing a board of managers to exercise authority over Houston ISD, and by assigning a conservator to oversee Houston ISD's governance; (2) whether Dr. Doris Delaney, the conservator appointed by Commissioner Morath, had the authority to suspend Houston ISD's superintendent search; and (3) whether the trial court must reconsider its temporary injunction under the Texas Education Code as amended by Senate Bill 1365.

The issue in this case is whether section 16.063 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code tolls the statute of limitations on an action when a resident defendant is physically absent from the state even though the defendant is still amenable to service by Texas courts.

The primary issue in these cases is whether an anti-abortion advocate is entitled to a Texas Citizens Participation Act dismissal of defamation claims brought for referring to certain abortion-related organizations as "criminal organizations."

At issue in this case is whether alleged reports made by two former managers at the Texas Health and Human Services Commission qualify as "good-faith reports [of] violation of law by [a] employing governmental entity" under the Whistleblower Act.

This case presents the question whether an independent investigator is a "lawyer's representative" for purposes of the attorney-client privilege when the investigator is not retained solely for legal advice. (Justice Blacklock not participating)

The issues in this case are (1) whether both substantive and procedural unconscionability must be shown to establish that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable; and (2) whether Shattenkirk produced sufficient evidence to establish that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable due to excessive costs.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether Texas courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when that defendant directs its actions toward the United States as a whole, but not Texas specifically.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether Texas courts have personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when that defendant directs its actions toward the United States as a whole, but not Texas specifically.

The primary issue in these cases is whether an executive order barring local mask mandates falls within the scope of authority granted to the Governor under the Texas Disaster Act.

This case concerns the City of Austin's immunity from premises-defect claims arising from an accident that occurred on a City-owned sidewalk.

This case concerns whether the Commissioner of Education has jurisdiction to review a petition to detach territory from one school district and annex it to another.

At issue in this case is whether the Texas Health and Human Services Commission reasonably interpreted the Medicaid "home" exclusion as requiring applicants asserting the exclusion to have previously occupied the property.

In this healthcare-liability claim arising from an emergency physician's treatment of a snakebite, the main issue is whether the plaintiff has produced some evidence of "willful and wanton negligence" by the physician, as required by statute.

The issue is whether Hensley's suit against the State Commission on Judicial Conduct is a collateral attack on a public warning the Commission issued against her.

At issue in this case is whether the statutory licensing requirement and conflict of interest prohibition for public insurance adjusting are content based restraints of free speech subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.

This direct appeal arises from a temporary injunction that enjoins the State from enforcing laws banning abortion in certain cases on the ground that the laws are unconstitutional.

At issue is whether Section 32.0705(d) of the Human Resources Code imposes a mandatory one-year time limit for the Health and Human Services Commission to conduct external audits of "Medicaid contractors."

This case raises questions of administrative law and judicial authority. The first issue is whether the Public Utility Commission exceeded its statutory authority by twice directing the Electric Reliability Council of Texas to affix electricity prices at $9000/MWh. The second issue is whether the court of appeals had the power, two years later, to unwind transactions with final settlement prices based upon those expired directives.

Case details to come.

A primary issue in this case is whether the State can conclusively establish Medicaid fraud at summary judgment when scienter is an essential element of the claim.

At issue is whether Section 21.223 of the Business Organizations Code shields a corporate agent from being held personally liable for torts committed during the course and scope of employment or in the role of corporate agent.

The issue in this case is whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over an appraisal district's claim that the Appraisal Review Board's appraisal of a taxpayer's property was below market value, even though the taxpayer brought, and the board decided, only an unequal-appraisal protest.

This case raises questions of administrative law. The first issue is whether the Public Utility Commission's approval of the Electric Reliability Council of Texas's NPRR 1081 protocol constitutes a "competition rule" under Section 39.001(e) of the Public Utility Regulatory Act and a "rule" under Section 2001.003(6)(A) of the Government Code. If the approval is considered a rule, then the second issue is whether it exceeds the Commission's statutory authority under PURA or violates the Administrative Procedure Act's mandatory rulemaking procedures.