In this next stage of dueling between the city and the city's pension system over onetime municipal employees employed by spinoff city corporations – and whether and how much the city owes for their pension contributions – the principal issues are (1) whether under the first stage decision by this Court, Klumb v. Houston Municipal Employees Pension System, the employees are covered by the pension system; (2) whether the pension system's ultra vires suit appropriate to enforce a meet-and-confer agreement with the city; (3) whether the pension system's public-information suit is barred because it was against the city and not a public-information officer; and (4) whether the pension system instead of its board has standing under the pension-requirements statute.
The issues in this contract-breach and fraud case are (1) whether pleadings or evidence determine one indivisible injury existed and (2) whether the collateral-source rule bars credit for settlements paid by the defendant's insurer and the plaintiffs' former law firms.
The principal issue in this crop-insurance case against a broker is whether an arbitration agreement incorporating American Arbitration Association rules shows clearly and unmistakably that a signatory intended an arbitrator to decide that arbitration covers claims against a party that did not sign the agreement.
In this action by an workers-compensation insurer to recover from a settlement with a liable third party the issue is whether a state insurance-department subrogation waiver override the insurer's statutory right to reimbursement.
The issues in this case involving a road-rage shooting by an off-duty county deputy constable are (1) whether the county has immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act's intentional-tort exclusion and (2) whether the deputy's firearm use authorized by the county falls under the tort-claims act's definition of negligent use of tangible personal property and, if so, (3) whether the county proximately caused the shooting injuries.
In this expunction case the issue is whether a person arrested at once for two separate offenses – convicted of one, a misdemeanor, and acquitted of the another, a felony – may clean her record of the charge for which she was acquitted.