05-0721 SSP Partners and Metro Novelties Inc. v. Gladstrong Investments (USA) Corp. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg In this indemnity action from a wrongful-death and products-liability case, the principal issues include (1) whether the court of appeals erred by holding the "apparent manufacturer" doctrine applied to a U.S. company held out as the product manufacturer by its closely allied foreign company and (2) whether the U.S. firm is the manufacturer because it and the foreign company are indistinguishable. SSP Partners sued Gladstone USA for indemnity after a judgment in a case alleging a child died as a result of a defective lighter. The trial court granted Gladstrong USA's motion asserting that no evidence showed it manufactured the lighter. The court of appeals reversed, holding in part that the common-law apparent manufacturer doctrine survives statutory indemnity provisions in Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code chapter 82.

05-0940 Central Ready Mix Concrete Co. Inc. v. Luciano Islas from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg A principal issue is whether a contractor owes any duty for the safety of an independent subcontractor's employees performing dangerous work. In this case Islas sued Central Ready Mix for injuries he suffered as he cleaned the rotating mixer on one of Central's cement trucks. Islas, employed by a subcontractor hired by Central to clean the trucks' mixing drums, was caught as he was climbing out of the mixing drum when a co-worker started the truck and the mixer began turning. A jury determined that Central was 20 percent responsible, but the trial court granted the company's motion to disregard the verdict. The court of appeals reversed.

05-0748 Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Marketing On Hold Inc. from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg In this interlocutory appeal from a class-certification order, the principal issues are (1) whether a corporation advancing claims it got by assignment can serve as class representative in a challenge to Southwestern Bell's billing for passed-along municipal fees and (2) whether the certified class met the requirement that common questions among the class predominate. Marketing On Hold, a firm that scrutinizes its clients' telephone bills for improper billing, took five claims by assignment and sought to certify the suit as a class action. The trial court named it class representative for nearly 7,000 Southwestern Bell customers in three phone-service categories. Of the claims Marketing On Hold held by assignment, none was in one of those categories. The court of appeals affirmed the class-certification order.

06-0074 Pastor Rick Barr and Philemon Homes Inc. v. City of Sinton from San Patricio County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg In this case, a challenge to a zoning restriction on houses for parolees established as a ministry, the principal issues are (1) whether the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act requires the city to accommodate the houses despite zoning prohibiting them and (2) whether the act requires the city to prove the regulation is the least-restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Barr sued to declare that the zoning violates state constitutional protection and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act because it prohibits a correctional or rehabilitation facility within 1,000 feet of the church - in this case, the church that sponsors them. The trial court held that the zoning was not a substantial burden Barr's religious beliefs. The court of appeals affirmed.

06-0501 Juan Mario Villafani, M.D. v. Adela Trejo from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: TBA For respondent: Robert E. Brzezinski, San Antonio The principal issue is whether an appellate court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the trial court's refusal to dismiss a medical-malpractice lawsuit, based on an allegedly inadequate expert report, when the plaintiff later took a nonsuit dropping the action but retaining the possibility of filing another. In this case, filed under the previous medical-malpractice statute, the trial court granted Trejo a nonsuit without prejudice after it denied the doctor's motion for sanctions and dismissal. The court of appeals, in a split decision, affirmed.

06-0952 In re Eduardo "Walo" Gracia Bazan from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For relator: Kelly K. McKinnis, McAllen For real party in interest: Cheryl Hole, Edinburg The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether 'forgiveness doctrine' operates to bar removal of officer convicted of crime alleged before re-election. The issue is whether is a constable may be removed from office and suspended pending appeal for a conviction that occurred years before his re-election. Bazan, a constable elected from a Hidalgo County precinct, seeks mandamus relief from a court order removing him for a felony conviction and suspending him during his appeal. Bazan was convicted of stealing a car by deception on allegations dating to October 2001, three years before he was re-elected. The trial court cited two provisions of the Texas Local Government Code requiring the removal and suspension, but Bazan argues that Local Government Code section 87.001 bars his removal for crimes that occurred before his re-election. The state argues that the Texas Constitution prohibits anyone convicted of bribery from holding public office, that Bazan's crime was bribery, so the constitution trumps Local Government Code section 87.001. The court of appeals denied Bazan's mandamus petition.

06-0178 Forest Oil Corp. and Daniel B. Worden v. James Argyle McAllen, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioners: Geoffrey L. Harrison, Houston For respondents: Craig T. Enoch and David Morris, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether arbitration clause in settlement bars. The principal issues are (1) whether a disclaimer in a settlement contract - that no other representations were made - bars a claim that an arbitration clause in the settlement was fraudulently induced; (2) whether reliance on a representation contrary to the contracts was justified; and (3) whether reliance on a representation during settlement negotiations was justified. In this case McAllen sued for personal injuries and for death of an endangered rhinoceros that allegedly resulted from radioactive pipe that Forest Oil had used on McAllen's property and that the company donated for McAllen's use on a reserve for exotic animals. McAllen and Forest Oil's settlement agreement ended a royalties dispute and included, among other provisions, an arbitration agreement for environmental claims not covered by the settlement. When Forest Oil moved to compel arbitration, McAllen countered that he was fraudulently induced to agree to arbitration on assurances that contamination or environmental problems did not exist on the land. The trial court denied arbitration and the court of appeals affirmed.

06-0550 New Texas Auto Auction Services, L.P. v. Graciela Gomez de Hernandez, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Scott T. Clark and Roger W. Hughes, Harlingen For respondents: Rebecca E. Hamilton, Dallas The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether auctioneers are 'sellers' in products-liability actions. In this case principal issues are (1) whether auto auctioneers can be "sellers" subject to strict liability and (2) whether the auctioneer was negligent for selling a vehicle subject to a defective-tire recall notice. Hernandez sued New Texas Auto Auction after a wreck in Mexico that killed her husband when he was driving an SUV the auction service owned and sold at auction to another auctioneer. The second auctioneer later sold the SUV to a dealer, which then sold it to Hernandez's husband. She alleges the tire defect caused the accident and claims both strict liability, based on the auctioneer as seller, and negligence because New Texas sold the vehicle with defective tires. New Texas Auto Auction argues that Texas should adopt the Third Restatement of Torts, which excludes auctioneers as sellers. The trial court granted summary judgment for the auctioneer on the strict-liability question and for Hernandez on the negligence issue. The court of appeals reversed on the strict-liability claim.

05-1042 JCW Electronics Inc. v. Pearl Iriz Garza from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Thomas F. Nye, Corpus Christi For respondents: Jane Webre, Austin The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether implied-warranty damages are subject to comparative liability restrictions. The principal issues in this product-liability case include (1) whether damages for breach of implied warranty are subject to the proportionate-responsibility statute or comparative responsibility under the Uniform Commercial Code chapter 2; (2) whether a contractor who installed a telephone in a jail cell can be liable based on breach of implied warranty for an inmate's suicide when the inmate used a phone cord to strangle himself; and (3) whether JCW was deprived of its statutory suicide defense by the trial court's denial of a jury question on it. Among other claims, Garza, mother of the man who committed suicide, sued for negligence and for breach of an implied warranty of suitability for a particular purpose. Jurors found for Garza on the warranty claim and determined the inmate was 60 percent negligent. The trial court denied the company's motion for a take-nothing judgment, based on proportionate responsibility. The court of appeals affirmed.

06-0422 Reliance Steel & Aluminum Co. and Samuel Alvarado v. Michael Sevcik and Cathy Loth from Waller County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioners: Thomas C. Wright, Houston; Russell H. McMains, Corpus Christi For respondents: David W. Holman, Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether gross sales evidence admissible in personal-injury case. Among principal issues in this personal-injury case are (1) whether the trial court erred by admitting evidence of the defendant company's gross sales when plaintiffs were not seeking punitive damages and (2) whether the appeals court erred by modifying an award for past medical expenses. Sevcik and Loth sued Reliance and its truck driver, Alvarado, over a collision that left Sevcik with physical injuries and Loth with permanent brain injury. At trial the judge rejected Reliance's attempt to show how much Loth earned before the accident, but allowed Loth to introduce evidence of Reliance's gross sales. On appeal Reliance argues that the gross sales testimony prejudiced the jury's damages awards. The court of appeals reduced an award for Loth's past medical expenses by $6,000, but otherwise affirmed damages Reliance challenged.

06-0372 Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare L.P. v. Alice H. Hawley and James A. Hawley from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Charles Watson, Austin For respondents: Darrin Mitchell Walker, Kingwood The Supreme Court will hear arguments on among principal issues in this medical-malpractice and wrongful death case against a hospital are (1) whether the trial court erred by refusing an instruction on new and independent cause when a pathology report diagnosed cancer that the patient did not receive for almost a year; (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing a "lost chance" instruction when conflicting evidence assessed the patient's survival chances; and (3) whether by failing to instruct the jury to disregard the independent pathologist's negligence the trial court commingled valid and invalid liability theories. The Hawleys sued the hospital, claiming the hospital was at fault for the pathology report's delay and that when she learned of the cancer after it became untreatable. She died while the case was on appeal. The trial court refused instructions on new and independent cause - that the doctors' delay in reading the pathology report caused any delay in the prospect of treatment; on "lost chance" - that the delay did not harm her because her chances of survival might have been less than 50 percent; and on not taking account of the pathologist's possible negligence as negligence by the hospital, because the pathologist worked for an independent contractor, not the hospital. The court of appeals affirmed.

06-0875 Ford Motor Co. v. Ezequiel Castillo, et al. from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Craig A. Morgan, Austin For respondents: Roger W. Hughes, Harlingen The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether summary judgment for contract breach was proper to enforce settlement. In this case involving allegations of a rogue juror, the principal issues are (1) whether the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on a settlement agreement without independent breach-of-contract pleadings and (2) whether the trial court erred by refusing additional discovery on jury misconduct allegations. Castillo and Ford promptly settled Castillo's personal-injury suit, alleging an accident caused by Ford's vehicle design defects, after the presiding juror sent a note to the judge asking what the limit on damages was. After the trial court dismissed the jury, Ford contended jurors told its lawyers that the presiding juror sent the note on her own and that the jury as a whole was leaning in Ford's favor. The trial court denied Ford's later motion to set aside the settlement agreement, based on jury misconduct or mutual mistake, or both, finding neither mutual mistake nor jury misconduct and ordered payment according to the agreement. When Ford did not pay, Castillo moved for summary judgment for breach of the settlement agreement. The trial court granted the motion. In a split decision, the court of appeals affirmed.

06-0890 Nabors Drilling, U.S.A. Inc. v. Francisca Escoto, et al. from Willacy County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Reagan W. Simpson, Houston For respondents: Alex M. Miller, San Antonio The Supreme Court will hear arguments on the issue of whether employer has duty to protect against danger of its fatigued employee en route home. The principal issues are (1) whether an employer has a duty to protect third parties from a fatigued employee en route home after a 12-hour shift and (2) whether the employee has a duty to train its employees about the dangers of fatigue. In this case Escoto sued Nabors after four members of her family died in a car accident allegedly caused by Nabor's employee on his way home after working five 12-hour graveyard shifts. Escoto alleged that Nabors was liable it had a duty to protect other people when its employee drove home after a exhausting shift and because the company failed to train its employees how to handle fatigue. The trial court entered a judgment in Nabor's favor after a jury verdict for Escoto, reasoning that Nabor did not owe a duty to Escoto. The court of appeals reversed.

(05-0653) Gilbert Kerlin, et al. v. Conception Sauceda, et al. from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioners: Claudia Wilson Frost and Jeremy Gaston, Houston For respondents: Jules L. Laird Jr., Houston The Supreme Court will hear arguments of limitations issue in heirs' claim to Padre Island land. In this case, a lawsuit by descendants of an original land-grant owner of Padre Island claiming interest in thousands of acres of the island, principal issues include (1) whether the statute of limitations was tolled by Kerlin's absence from the state and (2) whether equity should bar the claim. Descendants of Juan Jose Balli - whose uncle was Padre Island's namesake - sued Kerlin, claiming breach of contract, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty arising originally from Kerlin's purchase from the Balli heirs of any Padre Island interests by quitclaim deed in the 1930s. The Balli claimants also sued two of Kerlin's companies. Kerlin's purchase reserved to the Balli heirs a fraction of gas and oil royalties, if any such royalty interest existed. Kerlin bought the interests by quitclaim deed based on the prospect that the Balli heirs might still have legal title, based on a rescinded sale of the land in 1830. Kerlin and his companies argue that the statute of limitations in this case cannot be halted because, though he was out of state since the quitclaim deeds were bought, his companies were Texas-based. And even if limitations were tolled, they argue, the heirs should be barred by laches from bringing the lawsuit because they waited too long to sue, to the point when almost all witnesses to the half-century-old dealings were dead. A jury awarded damages to the Balli heirs. The court of appeals affirmed.

05-0801 S. Murthy Badiga, M.D. v. Maricruz Lopez from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Diana L. Faust, Dallas For respondent: E. A. Villareal Jr., Edinburg The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether in a medical-malpractice case a trial court's refusal to dismiss for failure to file a timely expert report can be subject to an interlocutory appeal. In this case the expert report was served three and a half months after the 120-day deadline, after the trial court granted two motions to extend time. A principal issue in this medical-malpractice case is whether an interlocutory appeal can be taken from a trial court's refusal to dismiss the lawsuit because an expert report was not filed on time. In this case the expert report was served three and a half months after the 120-day deadline, after the trial court granted two extensions. To support the second motion, Lopez contended the report was late because of a clerical error, not indifference. The case poses a statutory conflict between a provision that prohibits interlocutory appeals from orders denying dismissal when an extension is granted to cure a deficient expert report and a provision allowing such appeals when a dismissal motion is denied when an expert report is not filed on time. In this case the court of appeals dismissed the interlocutory appeal for want of jurisdiction. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0240 Miguel Hernandez, M.D. v. Julious Ebrom and Richard Hunnicutt from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: I. Cecilia Garza, McAllen For respondents: Richard W. Hunnicutt, San Antonio The Supreme Court will hear arguments on whether failure to bring interlocutory appeal on dismissal denial waives the challenge. A principal issue in this medical-malpractice case is whether by failing to file an interlocutory appeal the defendant waived his challenge to the trial court's denial of his dismissal motion. The court of appeals held that it had no jurisdiction over Hernandez's appeal because he waited until after the plaintiff dropped the case and provided in the nonsuit that it could not be filed again. As amended, while this suit was pending in the trial court, the medical-malpractice statute stipulates that an interlocutory appeal may be taken from an order denying a dismissal motion. A key question is whether that provision is mandatory or permissive. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0272 Dealers Electric Supply Co. v. Scoggins Construction Co. Inc. and Bill R. Scoggins from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Ben L. Aderholt, Houston For respondents: William F. Kimball, Harlingen For amici curiae American Subcontractors Association Inc. and Houston Hispanic Chamber of Commerce: J. Brett Busby, Houston The principal issue is whether the McGregor Act, prohibiting liens against a public building and providing for suit against principals and sureties over payment bonds, is an exclusive remedy to recover for credit extended to a subcontractor that abandoned an elementary school construction project. In this case Dealers sued for payment on $78,000 worth of materials an electrical subcontractor got under a joint checking account before abandoning the construction and absconding with the materials. At first Dealers sued the subcontractor, Scoggins and two bond companies from which Scoggins bought bonds to meet its McGregor Act obligations. Then when Dealers dropped the suits against the bond companies because it missed statutory notice deadlines, it continued the suit for payment under the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act and under the joint checking account. The trial court determined that Scoggins owed Dealers almost $136,000 in damages, costs and interest. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the McGregor Act was Dealers' exclusive remedy, which it lost for failure to give statutory notice to the bond companies. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0175 Whirlpool Corp. v. Margarita Camacho and Santos Camacho. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Lynne Liberato, Houston For respondent: Kevin Dubose, Houston Among principal issues in this product-liability case are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by failing to analyze expert testimony properly under a legal-sufficiency challenge, (2) whether expert testimony was improper because it was speculative on the safer alternative design and on the causation element; and (3) whether the trial court erred by failing to give a spoliation instruction because Whirlpool did not have notice of possible suit for three months despite plaintiffs' experts evaluating a home fire scene within two days of a fatal fire. In this case the Camachos sued after fire destroyed their trailer home and killed their son. They claim defective design of a clothes dryer allowed accumulated lint to be drawn to the dryer heater, where it ignited, then started clothes in the dryer afire and spread to the house. Whirlpool's challenge to the reliability of this theory, based on testing outside a dryer, was in part that the theory failed to explain that two T-shirts in the dryer did not burn. Whirlpool also complains that the Camachos had notice they would sue within days of the fire, but did not notify the company for several months, during which the fire scene was dismantled. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

07-0815 Intercontinental Group Partnership v. KB Home Lone Star L.P. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Jesse R. Castillo, San Antonio For respondent: Renee F. McElhaney, San Antonio The issue is whether in a contract-breach action the plaintiff can be the prevailing party, for attorney fees purposes, when the jury found the defendant breached the contract but did not award damages. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0465 State of Texas v. $281,420 in U.S. Currency from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Timothy A. Davis, Edinburg For amicus curiae Solicitor General: Sean D. Jordan, Austin For respondent: Edward A. Mallett, Houston The issues in this forfeiture case are (1) whether money found bundled in plastic and secreted in a truck axle can be determined to be contraband in the absence of more than suspicious circumstances and, if not contraband, (2) whether the last person in control of the truck should get the money if all potential owners lost their interests by default judgments. Huerta, a tow-truck driver who was hired to bring a truck tractor from Houston to the Rio Grande Valley, sued to intervene in this forfeiture action. Huerta said he was promised a 30 percent finder's fee of more than $281,000 he discovered in the truck axle and turned over to state authorities. The state claimed the money as drug-related contraband. A jury found that the money was not contraband, that Huerta was in joint or actual possession of it when it was seized and that he should get a $70,000 reward. The trial court overturned that verdict, giving all the money to the state. The court of appeals reversed and awarded Huerta the money. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0544 In re Scoggins Construction Co. Inc. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For relator: Craig A. Morgan, Austin For real party in interest: Lee H. Shidlofsky, Austin The principal issues are (1) whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion when it denied Scoggins, a general contractor for a school-construction project, permission to join subcontractors in the school district's breach-of-contract suit against Scoggins or to designate them as responsible third parties for allocating damages and (2) whether Scoggins has an adequate remedy by appeal if the trial court did abuse its discretion. After the Mercedes school district sued Scoggins, the trial court refused Scoggins' motion for leave to add the subcontractors pursuant to civil procedure Rule 38 or to designate them as responsible third parties under Civil Practices and Remedies Code chapter 33. The appeals court denied mandamus relief. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice O'Neil and Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0528 The John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Ann M. Fernandez from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg consolidated with 08-0529, Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Fernandez and 08-0534 Frost National Bank v. Ann M. Fernandez For petitioner Foundation: Macey Reasoner Stokes, Houston For petitioner Frost as trustee: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio For respondent: Julie Pendery, Dallas This appeal involves bills of review seeking to reopen two cases decided more than 30 years ago and a 60-year-old declaratory judgment on a will construction involving a South Texas ranching fortune. The bills to set aside the judgments were brought on behalf of Ann M. Fernandez, who claims she is a daughter born out of wedlock to famed rancher John G. Kenedy Jr. and a Kenedy housemaid. The principal issues are (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction for its summary judgment favoring the foundation when bills of review in the county probate court seeking the same relief were pending while the probate court determined the heirship claim and (2) whether the discovery rule saves the would-be heir's claim because the purported paternity was recently discovered. The district court ruled that Fernandez lacked standing to bring her suits, but the court of appeals held that the district court should have abated its cases while the probate court determined heirship, a threshold for the standing question. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice O'Neil and Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0528 The John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Ann M. Fernandez from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg consolidated with 08-0529, Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Fernandez and 08-0534 Frost National Bank v. Ann M. Fernandez For petitioner Foundation: Macey Reasoner Stokes, Houston For petitioner Frost as trustee: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio For respondent: Julie Pendery, Dallas This appeal involves bills of review seeking to reopen two cases decided more than 30 years ago and a 60-year-old declaratory judgment on a will construction involving a South Texas ranching fortune. The bills to set aside the judgments were brought on behalf of Ann M. Fernandez, who claims she is a daughter born out of wedlock to famed rancher John G. Kenedy Jr. and a Kenedy housemaid. The principal issues are (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction for its summary judgment favoring the foundation when bills of review in the county probate court seeking the same relief were pending while the probate court determined the heirship claim and (2) whether the discovery rule saves the would-be heir's claim because the purported paternity was recently discovered. The district court ruled that Fernandez lacked standing to bring her suits, but the court of appeals held that the district court should have abated its cases while the probate court determined heirship, a threshold for the standing question. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice O'Neil and Justice Guzman not sitting) 08-0528 The John G. and Marie Stella Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Ann M. Fernandez from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg consolidated with 08-0529, Kenedy Memorial Foundation v. Fernandez and 08-0534 Frost National Bank v. Ann M. Fernandez For petitioner Foundation: Macey Reasoner Stokes, Houston For petitioner Frost as trustee: Jacqueline M. Stroh, San Antonio For respondent: Julie Pendery, Dallas This appeal involves bills of review seeking to reopen two cases decided more than 30 years ago and a 60-year-old declaratory judgment on a will construction involving a South Texas ranching fortune. The bills to set aside the judgments were brought on behalf of Ann M. Fernandez, who claims she is a daughter born out of wedlock to famed rancher John G. Kenedy Jr. and a Kenedy housemaid. The principal issues are (1) whether the district court had jurisdiction for its summary judgment favoring the foundation when bills of review in the county probate court seeking the same relief were pending while the probate court determined the heirship claim and (2) whether the discovery rule saves the would-be heir's claim because the purported paternity was recently discovered. The district court ruled that Fernandez lacked standing to bring her suits, but the court of appeals held that the district court should have abated its cases while the probate court determined heirship, a threshold for the standing question. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0159 Samuel Garcia Jr., M.D. v. Maria Gomez, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: I. Cecilia Garza, McAllen For respondents: Savannah L. Robinson, Danbury The principal issue is whether an attorney's unchallenged testimony as to what he would have charged in a case, without more, legally supports an attorneys-fee sanction for filing a medical-malpractice claim without an expert report. Gomez first sued Garcia for medical malpractice, based on Dr. Garcia's alleged failure to use a screen during surgery to prevent an embolism. The patient died after an embolism. When an X-ray revealed such a filter had been implanted, Gomez quit pursuing the claim, but did not nonsuit the case and did not file an expert report by the 120-day deadline. Garcia moved for attorneys fees under Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code section 74.351(b). Garcia's attorney testified without challenge as to reasonable fees in such a case. The trial court denied the motion for sanctions and the appeals court affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-0995 In re Columbia Valley Healthcare System, L.P. from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For relator: Mike A. Hatchell, Austin For real parties in interest: Carlos Escobar and Juan A. Magallanes, Brownsville The issue is whether a legal assistant who worked on the other side of a case disqualifies her new law firm when the extent of her involvement in the case was allegedly administrative. In this medical-malpractice case attorneys for a hospital's owners moved to disqualify the plaintiffs' law firm because one of its legal assistants had been employed by the hospital's lead counsel, responsible for filing privileged documents and handling investigative material and documents pertaining to strategy and settlement. Before she left the hospital's law firm she signed a confidentiality agreement that obligated her not to work on any matter that she previously worked on for the law firm. The counsel who hired her admonished her not to work on cases she worked on at the previous firm, although she filed correspondence involving the malpractice case and did other work, including rescheduling a docket conference, handling correspondence and calls concerning it and copying the plaintiffs' son's birth certificate and Social Security records. The trial court denied the disqualification motion. The appeals court affirmed. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

08-1066 Michael T. Jelinek, M.D., and Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare, L.P. v. Francisco Casas and Alfredo DeLeon Jr. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner Jelinek: I. Cecilia Garza, McAllen For petitioner Columbia: Sarah B. Duncan, Austin For respondents: John N. Mastin, San Antonio Principal issues are (1) whether the hospital preserved error in this medical-malpractice case when the claimed error concerns an instruction that is not in the record and (2) whether an expert report assessing the doctor's alleged negligence was inadequate for inferring support for the care standard and for causation. After first suing for wrongful death, Casas amended the petition to claim suffering and mental distress because his wife, after bowel surgery for a perforated colon and with a known infection, did not get antibiotics for four days because the hospital did not automatically renew her prescription. At one point in this lapse odor from the infection was so great fans were used to dissipate it. At trial, the hospital contends, it offered an "unavoidable accident" instruction that the court denied. But the instruction was not in the record. Jelinek, who prescribed the antibiotics but was on vacation when the prescription expired, argues that the expert report did not address how his deviation from the applicable care standard proximately caused Mrs. Casas' suffering and mental distress. The appeals court affirmed a jury award for Casas, holding that the claimed instructional error was not preserved, and affirmed the trial court's ruling that the expert report on Jelinek's alleged negligence was adequate. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

(Justice Green not sitting) 09-0039 BIC Pen Corp. v. Janace M. Carter from Matagorda County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Reagan W. Simpson, Austin For cross-petitioner/respondent: Lisa Powell, McAllen Principal issues in this case involving injuries resulting from a child playing with a lighter are (1) whether federal law preempts the manufacturing-defect claim and the causation theory based on it; (20 whether legally sufficient evidence supported causation and a manufacturing defect; and (3) whether legally sufficient evidence supported the jury's malice finding for exemplary damages. The Court earlier held that federal law by implication preempted a lighter design-defect claim in reversing a judgment for Carter. On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the jury's manufacturing-defect verdict for Carter, but reversed the punitive-damages award. The first argument begins at 9 a.m. in the courtroom in Austin. Each side will have 20 minutes for argument. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0223 Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v. City of Alton, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: J.W. Dyer, McAllen For respondents: Stephen L. Tatum, Fort Worth, and Eileen M. Leeds, Brownsville Principal issues in this contract and negligence case, involving Sharyland's complaint that the city's sewer contractors violated state regulations for sewer- and water-line separation, are (1) whether those regulations (Texas Administrative Code section 317.13(1)(B)) apply to these sewer lines connecting lots to sewer mains; (2) whether the economic-loss rule bars Sharyland's negligence claim against the contractors; and (3) whether Sharyland is a third-party beneficiary of Alton's contract with the sewer-line installers. In this case Sharyland sued the city and the city's sewer-line contractors after discovering sewer lines placed above its water lines allegedly violating state regulations. Sharyland argues that it should not have to wait for sewer leakage to contaminate its water before suing for damages that would include remediation costs and loss of value to a once-legal water supply system. Alton and the sewer contractors argue that the administrative regulations do not cover the sewer lines in question because those regulations do not apply to individual connections to the sewer mains. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0857 Jose Carreras, M.D. v. Carlos Francisco Marroquin, et al. from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Ronald G. Hole, McAllen For respondents: Fernando G. Mancias, Edinburg The issue is whether the medical-malpractice limitations period is postponed under Civil Practices and Remedies Code section when the plaintiff gives pre-suit notice within the two-year limitations but not the required medical-information release. After his wife died following surgery, Marroquin sued Dr. Carreras. His notice of the lawsuit did not include a release for his wife's medical records. He then filed suit after the two-year limitations had run, but authorized the release several months later. Marroquin argues that section 74.051(c) tolls limitations when the pre-suit notice is sent and the required release, which section requires to be filed with the pre-suit notice, is independent of the tolling provision and has its own penalty for noncompliance. The trial court denied Carreras' summary-judgment motion and the court of appeals affirmed. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0941 Service Corporation International and SCI Texas Funeral Services Inc. v. Juanita G. Guerra, et al. from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioners: Mike A. Hatchell, Austin For respondents: Mark L. Kinkaid, Austin Principal issues are (1) whether evidence of other suits against cemeteries owned by the parent company unconstitutionally affected punitive damages awarded in this mental-anguish claim involving mishandling a corpse; (2) whether the parent company is liable for subsidiary employees' conduct; and (3) whether the recovery standard was satisfied for mental-anguish damages. In this case Guerra along with her children sued Service Corp. International and its wholly owned subsidiary, alleging, among other claims, intentional infliction of emotional distress for mishandling her husband's corpse. Finding it had sold the Guerras side-by-side funeral plots but one had previously been sold, SCI Texas asked if Mr. Guerra's body could be moved. When Mrs. Guerra said no, company employees moved his coffin a foot or more into the adjacent plot but did not tell her. During the trial the court allowed evidence of a class-action settlement involving SCI's Florida subsidiary. Jurors found SCI, the parent, directly liable, assessed its liability at 70 percent and the Texas subsidiary's at 30 percent and awarded $4 million in punitive damages. The court of appeals modified the punitive damages, then affirmed as modified. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

09-0999? Texas A&M University-Kingsville v. Melody Yarbrough? from Kleberg County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: David S. Morales, Austin ?For respondent: Kevin F. Lungwitz, Austin? The principal issues in this declaratory-judgment action are (1) whether a college professor's complaint about an evaluation stated an ultra vires claim that should have been against university officials instead of the institution and (2) whether university policy allowing an aggrieved employee to rebut an evaluation violates Texas Government Code section 617.005's provision if a public employee's complaint about working conditions is heard by an administrator without authority to remedy the problem. In this case Yarbrough complained that A&M-Kingsville's grievance policy did not provide her the right to complain to a person with authority to remedy errors in the evaluation she believed might hurt her chances for tenure. (She later got tenure, despite the evaluation, raising a question whether her suit is moot). The trial court granted the university's summary-judgment motion, but the court of appeals reversed. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0523 Port Elevator-Brownsville LLC v. Rogelio Casados and Rafaela Casados from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Mary A. Keeney, Austin For respondents: David Keltner, Fort Worth The issue is whether a temporary employee provided by a staffing company is limited to a workers-compensation recovery against the client company when its policy has classifications not explicitly including the temporary employee and the client employer does not pay premiums specifically for temporary employees. In this case Casados' parents sued Port Elevator after his work-site death. Casados was an employee of a temporary-staffing company that provided workers for Port Elevator. Port Elevator's workers-comp insurer initially refused coverage. The trial court denied the elevator company's summary-judgment motion, based on the "comp bar" provision limiting an injured worker's remedies to workers-comp insurance. A jury found Port Elevator negligent in Casados' death. On review, the appeals court held Casados was not covered under Port Elevator's workers-comp policy and affirmed the trial-court judgment. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0223 Centocor Inc. v. Patricia Hamilton and Thomas Hamilton, et al. from Nueces County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Robert M. (Randy) Roach Jr., Houston For respondents/cross-petitioners: Craig T. Enoch, Austin For cross-respondent Michael G. Bullen, M.D.: Thomas F. Nye, Corpus Christi For amici curiae Texas Medical Association, et al.: R. Brent Cooper, Dallas Principal issues are (1) whether the court of appeals erred by discounting the learned-intermediary doctrine when fraud allegations were based on a drug-marketing video shown to patients; (2) whether expert testimony should have been required to assist in establishing that the existing warning was unreasonably dangerous; and (3) whether the product's side-effects warning can prove causation of one of those effects. In his case the Hamiltons sued after Patricia Hamilton developed lupus-like symptoms from a drug she used to treat her Crohn's disease. They alleged Centocor, the drug manufacturer, used direct-to-patient advertising that did not include side-effects warnings about symptoms she developed. A jury found Centocor committed fraud and awarded damages, including punitive damages. On review, the appeals court rejected Centocor's argument that the learned-intermediary doctrine shielded it from liability because Mrs. Hamilton's prescribing doctor was responsible for warning her about adverse effects. It held the doctrine was defeated when the manufacturer was misleading in a promotional video by omitting potential adverse effects. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0953 Ford Motor Co. v. Richard H. Garcia from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: Michael Eady, Austin For respondent: Isaac Tawil, McAllen The principal issues are whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding fees to a guardian ad litem for work allegedly outside the scope of his appointment or relied on insufficient evidence in its award. Ford appealed Garcia's $28,200 award for his appointment as a guardian ad litem. The trial court appointed him to protect the interests of a man in a settlement by Ford with the man, who suffered traumatic brain injury, and his wife. Ford argues the guardian ad litem billed for review of litigation documents and other work that exceeded his need to assure the injured man's interests in a proposed settlement. Ford also argued the guardian's invoice did not specify how much time was spent on his review or how much was spent by his staff. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's award of Garcia's fee. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0802 Mission Consolidated Independent School District v. Gloria Garcia from Hidalgo County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioner: David P. Hansen, Austin For respondent: Savannah Robinson, Danbury Two principal issues in this age-discrimination claim are (1) whether a prima-facie case can be established when the replacement worker is older than the discharged employee bringing the claim and (2) whether the 60-day filing deadline in the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act includes within it service of process and, if so, whether compliance is jurisdictional. Garcia, who was 48 when she was fired, sued the district for discrimination after filing her administrative complaint with the Texas Workforce Commission. Mission school district moved to dismiss the lawsuit, based on a jurisdictional plea because Garcia failed to state jurisdictional facts to support her age-discrimination claim by showing her work replacement was older than she was. The trial court denied the district's plea. The appeals court affirmed on the age claim, reasoning that the district's contention that Garcia's replacement was three years older did not conclusively negate the required element that she might "otherwise show that she was discharged because of age" apart from showing her replacement was younger. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0927 This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

10-0928 Raul Ernesto Loaisiga, M.D. and Raul Ernesto Loaisiga, M.D., P.A. v. Guadalupe Cerda and Cindy Velez from Cameron County and the 13th District Court of Appeals, Corpus Christi/Edinburg For petitioners: Carlos Escobar, McAllen For respondents: Brendan K. McBride, San Antonio The principal issues are (1) whether alleged sexual assaults during medical examinations constitute health care-liability claims and (2) whether an expert report based solely on pleadings was sufficient. In this case Cerda sued Loaisiga, her daughter's pediatrician, for assault, medical; negligence, gross negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress after Loaisiga allegedly held her daughter's breast as he examined her for a sinus ailment. Velez, a nurse at the clinic where Loaisiga practiced, sued him after he allegedly held her breast when checking her flu symptoms. Both Velez and Cerda submitted an expert report by a family practitioner to comply with health care-liability requirements. Loaisiga moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that the expert report was insufficient because the doctor based it entirely on the lawsuit pleadings and not on interviews with Cerda's daughter or with Velez, and because the family-practice doctor was not qualified. The trial court denied the dismissal motion and the court of appeals affirmed, reasoning in part that sexual assault is not an inseparable part of medical care. This advisory serves only as an abbreviated guide to oral argument. Summaries are prepared by the Court's staff attorney for public information and reflect his judgment alone on facts and legal issues and in no way represent the Court's opinion about case merits. Texas Supreme Court advisory Contact: Osler McCarthy, Staff Attorney for Public Information (512) 463.1441 or email: osler.mccarthy@courts.state.tx.us

The principal issue is whether an ostensible innocent purchaser is charged with knowing that a judgment conveying an easement to the city that intended to correct a clerical mistake invalidly voided a prior judgment giving the city fee-simple title to the disputed property. A.P.I. Pipe and Supply bought land that included almost 10 acres burdened by the drainage easement established by the judgment nunc pro tunc, then sued TxDOT and Edinburg (which conveyed the easement to TxDOT). A.P.I. Pipe and Supply alleged TxDOT took stone and other materials excavated from the property that belonged to A.P.I. The court of appeals held that A.P.I. could rely on the void later judgment because A.P.I. had no duty to determine whether the judgment granting the easement was void.

The principal issue is whether a 100-foot-wide street dedicated for public use conditioned on a provision for 15-foot curb lines on each side limited the public right-of-way easement to 70 feet. As part of a proposal to widen the street--Arroyo Boulevard, designated by the Transportation Department as Farm-to-Market Road 1847 in Los Fresnos--TxDOT sued NICO to remove a building that encroached on what the state claimed was its easement. In granting summary judgment in the building owner's favor, the trial court ruled that the public right-of-way easement was bordered by the curb lines, or 70 feet wide. The court of appeals affirmed.

The issue is whether statutory attorney fees constitute compensatory damages or costs awarded in the judgment for a deposit to supersede the judgment on appeal. In this mandamus action Nalle Plastics seeks relief from a Corpus Christi law firm's successful effort to increase Nalle's supersedeas deposit to reflect its attorney-fees award. The court of appeals denied the mandamus petition seeking to overturn the trial court's order increasing the deposit.

The principal issues in this diesel-spill case are (1) whether sanctions were excessive that struck Petroleum Solutions' statute-of-limitations defense and included a spoliation instruction because an independent analyst lost a connector suspected as the cause of the diesel leak and (2) whether the trial court erred by indemnifying Titeflex, a component manufacturer, for attorney fees and costs. The court of appeals affirmed the sanctions order.

Among issues in this effort to vacate a Texas trial setting on product-liability claims from a rollover accident in Mexico are (1) whether the person killed in the accident and his death beneficiaries are a "single plaintiff" under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 71.051(h)(2) and (2) whether only the decedent's residence must be considered when determining the plaintiff's status as a legal Texas resident under section 71.051(e). In this case Juan Tueme Mendez, the driver of a Ford Explorer in the accident that killed his brother, Cesar Mendez, sued his brother's estate administrator in a Texas probate court where probate was filed. The administrator then sued Ford and the tire manufacturer. The administrator, Cesar Mendez's daughter, is a U.S. citizen and Texas resident. Both Mendez brothers were Mexican citizens with U.S. visas, although Ford and the administrator, together with Cesar's relatives who intervened, dispute whether Cesar was a Mexican resident. Two relatives who intervened, another of Cesar's daughters and her mother, are U.S. citizens and Texas residents. The trial court denied Ford's motion to dismiss, arguing that the forum was inconvenient. Ford petitioned for mandamus relief, but the court of appeals denied it.

The issues are (1) whether a settlement check jointly payable to the hospital lienholder and claimant releases the insurer from liability under the state's hospital lien statute and (2) whether the hospital lienholder may sue the insurer when the settlement check was cashed with only the claimant's signature. In this case two people injured in accident caused by State Farm's insured got checks made out to them and to the hospital, which secured its reimbursement with hospital liens, and cashed them without the hospital's endorsement. The hospital sued to recover from State Farm, but the trial court awarded summary judgment for the insurance company. The appeals court affirmed, holding that State Farm met its statutory duty to comply with the lien and its release.

In this maritime case, the issues are (1) whether the trial court erred by rejecting a jury-charge modification submitted after the charge conference but before the jury was charged and (2) whether the appeals court erred by determining that Tamez was following specific orders in an emergency despite differing evidence on the point (bearing on his damage award under the Jones Act because the jury found he was 50-percent negligent). Tamez, who claimed he injured an arm when summoned to help the boat captain and another seaman, sued. At the charge conference Tamez asked for and got a question whether the injury resulted from his response to a specific order. Then after the conference, King Fisher Marine objected to the specific-order question and offered an instruction defining jury charge. The trial court ruled the objection was too late. Jurors found Tamez 50 percent responsible for his injury and awarded him damages, finding he was working under a specific order. The appeals court affirmed, then denied rehearing despite both parties arguing that Weeks Marine Inc. v. Garza, a subsequent decision defining specific order under maritime law, should be analyzed.

The issues are (1) whether federal maritime law applies in a negligence suit against a business that organized a fishing retreat at which an invited guest allegedly became intoxicated on a boat and afterward drove a car that collided with a motorcycle and, if so, (2) whether the business owed a duty to the injured plaintiffs. In this case the Artheys sued Schlumberger, claiming Schlumberger should have supervised the invited guest, Huff, on the fishing boat on the morning just before the retreat ended. Schlumberger provided alcoholic drinks during the two-day retreat, but not on the boat. The trial court granted Schlumberger's summary-judgment motion, arguing it had no duty to the Artheys. The court of appeals reversed, holding that maritime law applied and that a fact question existed on the duty question.

The principal issue is whether legally sufficient evidence supported a jury's design-defect finding when a fully extended indoor-utility lift fell with a worker at the top of it when it was moved contrary to warnings. Matak's estate sued Genie for defectively designing the lift, arguing that four alternative designs would have prevented his death. With Matak in a bucket 40 feet above a church floor where he was installing fiber-optic cables in a ceiling, a co-worker and a church employee tried to move the lift despite placards on the machine that moving it with the lift extended could result in death or serious injury. Jurors found the lift was defectively designed. The appeals court affirmed judgment for Matak's estate.

In this arbitration dispute the principal issues include (1) whether the trial court erred by interpreting a limitations clause to bar arbitration instead of leaving that decision to the arbitrator; (2) whether that bar on arbitrating contract claims should also extend to arbitrating the lawsuit's negligence claims; and (3) whether non-signatories to the contract can compel arbitration when the contract specified that third parties could not claim rights under it. In this case Leach, a general contractor building Sapphire's South Padre Island condominium project, moved to compel arbitration after it was joined in Sapphire's lawsuit against insurance brokers and architects. Sapphire sought flooding damages caused by Hurricane Dolly in 2008, alleging the insurance brokers allowed coverage to lapse before the project was finished and the architects negligently designed the project. The brokers and architects then joined Leach and its subcontractors. Leach and later the subcontractors moved to compel arbitration based on Leach's contract with Sapphire. The trial court ruled for Sapphire that Leach's move for arbitration was too late under the contract's limitations clause and that the contract barred non-signatories from claiming any rights under it despite a provision allowing arbitration by joined parties. The appeals court affirmed.

Two principal issues in this contest over interest from a divorce decree's enforcement are (1) whether the appeals court's decision that relief should have been granted instead of the trial court's denial of it by interlocutory order triggers interest from the interlocutory-order date and (2) whether a judgment ostensibly disposing all claims is final if a claim for attorney fees remains pending and requires additional evidence. This appeal is the third stage in a case dating to 1997, when Johnson sought to enforce agreed-upon alimony in the original decree from a common-law marriage. In its most recent decision the appeals court held that prejudgment and post-judgment interest accrued from the trial court's erroneous denial in 1998 of Johnson's enforcement motion. Ventling argues that interest should be calculated from the court of appeals' judgment in 2012 because the 2012 judgment cannot supersede the 1998 interlocutory order on the enforcement motion. Johnson contends interest should date from 1998, when the trial court should have entered a proper judgment.

A principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by rejecting a law firm's effort to compel arbitration with a client by deciding the arbitration agreement was one-sided and legally unconscionable based only on the firm's contract. In this case Lopez sued for malpractice, unhappy with the mediated result of the underlying suit. His agreement with the firm specified that any claim he brought against it would be subject to arbitration, but that the firm could litigate any dispute to collect its fees. The trial court refused the firm's arbitration motion. In a split decision the court of appeals affirmed.

A principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by rejecting a law firm's effort to compel arbitration with a client by deciding the arbitration agreement was one-sided and legally unconscionable based only on the firm's contract. In this case Lopez sued for malpractice, unhappy with the mediated result of the underlying suit. His agreement with the firm specified that any claim he brought against it would be subject to arbitration, but that the firm could litigate any dispute to collect its fees. The trial court refused the firm's arbitration motion. In a split decision the court of appeals affirmed.

The issues in this contract-breach and fraud case are (1) whether, as the court of appeals held, statutory limits on exemplary damages must be pleaded as an affirmative defense and (2) whether the appeals court erred by affirming prejudgment interest, lien foreclosures and a fraud finding without considering the jury's contract-breach finding to be legally and factually sufficient. Aypco sued Zorrilla after she allegedly quit paying for Aypco's work under a contract to build her house and for additional work not covered by the contract she ordered on another house. A jury found for the contractor on both the breach-of-contract and fraud claims. The trial court awarded slightly more than $56,000 in actual damages and $250,000 in exemplary damages, plus interest and fees, after Aypco elected to recover for fraud. The court also ordered mechanic's and materialman's liens on Zorrilla's two properties foreclosed to satisfy the judgment. The court of appeals affirmed.

In this case alleging the Texas Railroad Commission wrongfully plugged an oil-and-gas well, the principal issues are (1) whether the commission has a statutory immunity defense that protects it from damages in this case despite the Legislature's consent that it could be sued and (2) whether the trial court erred by not instructing jurors on good faith. Gulf sued the Railroad Commission for negligence and contract breach for plugging a well it agreed not to plug after the Legislature waived the commission's immunity from suit. In this appeal, the commission argues that a Texas Natural Resources Code provision - section 89.045 - protecting it from a good-faith mistake in plugging the well acts as an affirmative defense. The commission contends the trial court erred by refusing its good-faith jury question because the legislative waiver was from suit alone, not from liability. The appeals court affirmed.

In this interlocutory appeal from denied special appearances by a Mexican television producer, anchor and broadcaster sued for defamation in Texas, the principal issue is whether defendants have minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction in Texas based on the broadcast signal's international reach, their efforts to sell advertising in Texas, their sending reporters to Texas and U.S. cable channels' rebroadcast of their programming in Texas. In this case the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the special appearances to contest jurisdiction in Texas, holding that Texas has personal jurisdiction, both specific and general, over the defendants. TV Azteca and the other defendants argue that the allegedly libelous broadcasts were produced in Mexico and, although the plaintiff, Mexican pop superstar Gloria Trevi, lives in Texas, concerned events about her that occurred in Mexico and Brazil.

The issues in the case by a railroad employee under the Federal Employer's Liability Act are (1) whether the railroad was entitled to judgment despite the verdict against the railroad, for failing to protect the employee from contracting West Nile virus, because mosquito bites are a natural threat excluded from the federal law's scope and (2) whether sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict that the employee contracted the virus in the course of his employment. Nami sued Union Pacific after contracting West Nile virus and encephalitis allegedly while working on track maintenance in Brazoria County, claiming Union Pacific failed to warn about mosquito-illness dangers and failed to provide repellant or require its employees to use it. The trial court denied Union Pacific's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict for Phillips, arguing that the so-called ferae naturae doctrine precludes recovery under the federal law and that legally sufficient evidence does not support the jury's verdict.

The issue is whether suppressed evidence may establish contraband necessary to justify civil forfeiture when the contraband resulted from a search following a warrantless arrest based on an allegedly unreliable informant's tip. In trial to contest the forfeiture Herrera, the vehicle owner, moved to suppress drugs and weapons found in the car after it was searched incident to his arrest. The trial court ruled the evidence inadmissible because state troopers arrested him illegally, without sufficient cause to stop him and search his vehicle. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the forfeiture statute - Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 59.03(b) - precluded the state's seizing the vehicle after an illegal search.

In this case by school districts challenging rulings that each owes the state more money under the school-finance law because of increased property values, the issues are (1) whether the education commissioner acted without authority by his interpretation of the school-finance law to require the districts to give back money and, if so, (2) whether the trial court's relief - granting credits by an accounting adjustment - is properly prospective in an ultra vires suit. After the commissioner ordered the Sterling City district to pay more to account for higher property-tax revenues, the district sued, contending the commissioner ordered the "claw back" by going beyond three statutory factors controlling when a district could be ordered to rebate money to the state. The trial court denied the commissioner's jurisdictional plea, based on sovereign immunity, concluding the commissioner acted without authority and immunity does not protect his discretion to interpret the school-finance law without judicial review. The court of appeals affirmed.

In this tax-protest case the issue is whether Hallmark was obligated to include a net loss from sale of an investment asset when it reported its companywide gross receipts in calculating its Texas franchise tax. The comptroller alleges Hallmark underpaid by close to $200,000 its franchise tax for 2008 because it did not include in its calculations a $628 million loss on investments that the company deducted on its federal taxes. By failing to include the loss, Hallmark's gross receipts reported to Texas were greater that the comptroller believes they should have been and, as the comptroller argues, because those receipts are divided by what Hallmark sold in Texas its franchise-tax calculation was smaller than it should have been. But Hallmark argues that the franchise-tax law requires it specifically to include in its gross receipts only a net gain from an investment or capital-asset sale, not a loss. The appeals court held the comptroller's interpretation was reasonable.

The issues are (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction to decide this interlocutory appeal and, if so, (2) whether an agreement by which a contractor provides workers-compensation coverage for a subcontractor and its employees protects the subcontractor from a negligence claim by the general contractor's injured employee. The second issue raises an ostensible conflict between Texas Labor Code sections 406.122(b) and 406.123(a) and (e) on defining a subcontractor's employees as the general contractor's when workers comp is involved. (Section 406.122(b) arguably excludes them, 406.123 ostensibly does the opposite.) In this case, by agreement, Union Carbide provided workers-comp coverage for subcontractor TIC and its employees. Injured on the job, Martin first drew benefits from Union Carbide's workers-compensation insurer. Then Martin, a Carbide employee, sued TIC, claiming it negligently caused his injury and, by section 406.122(b)'s exclusion of independent subcontractors, could not be Carbide's deemed employee. The trial court denied TIC's summary-judgment motion that workers comp was Martin's exclusive remedy. Reviewing the trial court's summary-judgment decision, the court of appeals affirmed. It held on its own motion that Labor Code sections 406.122 and 406.123 were irreconcilable. But, because neither Martin nor TIC raised the conflict, the court said the company did not meet its burden to establish its exclusive-remedy affirmative defense by failing to eliminate section 406.122(b)'s bearing on the deemed-employee question.

The issues are (1) whether a limited partnership that owns a hospital may be vicariously liable for a physician's negligence when the doctor is a limited partner and (2) whether the general partner may be vicariously liable too. In this case the Andrades sued for their daughter's injuries that they attribute to an obstetrician's negligence during her birth. They added as defendants the hospital limited partnership and the hospital's general partner, RGV Med. Their suit bases that vicarious liability principally on Texas Business Occupations Code section 152.303(a), which makes a partnership responsible for injuries when a partner - the doctor in this case - acts in the partnership's ordinary business or with the partnership's authority. Both the hospital limited partnership and its general partner argue that they did not control the doctor's medical judgment and that their ordinary business was providing and operating the hospital, not obstetrical services. The trial court denied summary judgment for the partnership and general partner. The appeals court affirmed on interlocutory review, holding summary judgment was precluded by an unresolved fact question: whether the doctor was acting within the scope of the partnership business or with its authority.

The issues are (1) whether a property owner may be liable to an independent contractor's employee for negligent entrustment of equipment; (2) whether Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter 95 applies to negligent entrustment; (3) whether a reference to the defendant as a "slave master" in closing argument was reversible error, even in the absence of black jurors; and (4) whether the jury was improperly charged by broad form submitting comparative responsibility for negligent entrustment together with premises liability.

The principal issues are (1) whether an insured must prove an alleged injury independent from denied policy benefits to proceed with a deceptive-or-unfair-insurance-practices claim under Insurance Code chapter 541 or, if not, (2) whether finding an insurance contract was not breached precludes the insured from separately recovering policy benefits under the Insurance Code.

In this negligence lawsuit against an architecture firm, the principal issues are (1) whether the factual basis of each claim is established by the required merit certificate and (2) whether, and how, an expert must establish knowledge and expertise to assess professional practice by such a certificate.

The principal issues are (1) whether the rule in Tooke v. City of Mexia - that statutory "sue and be sued" language does not waive governmental immunity - applies retroactively to attack a 1995 judgment as void and (2) whether, if Tooke is retroactive, governmental immunity deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to declare the judgment void.

In this appeal from reversal of summary judgment against Rincones, principal issues are (1) whether limitations bars negligence and tortious interference claims against a contract drug-testing company that alleged negligent analysis of a drug screen; (2) whether the appeals court erred by its tacit approval of a "self-compelled" defamation claim, based on Rincones reporting to a subsequent employer his discharge because of the drug test; (3) whether Rincones's evidence supported his discrimination claim against the employer that fired him; (4) whether evidence supported his retaliation claim against his employer; and (5) whether ExxonMobil, which contracted with Rincones's employer to provide refinery workers, may be vicariously liability for the drug-testing company's negligence based on ExxonMobil's adoption of a drug-safety program.

The issue is whether an insurance company's attorney fees and the basis for them are discoverable when the insurer is not seeking its fees but is contesting fees the insureds seek for underpayment of their damage claims.

The principal issues are (1) whether a cardiovascular surgeon's firing, under a contract provision allowing termination without cause after a set employment period, requires the employer to prove it fired the surgeon on without-cause grounds to disprove a contract-breach claim; (2) whether the employment contract's stipulation for "annual practice losses" is ambiguous and, if not, whether the hospital the employer established the condition to terminate without cause; (3) whether a tortious interference-with-contract claim is precluded if the contract was not breached; and (4) whether the Second Torts Restatement's truthful-information defense (section 772) should be adopted in this case and, if so, whether it would cover a consultant's performance assessment to preclude the tortious-interference claim.

The issues are (1) whether the trial court erred in charging the jury that this case was one for general negligence, not premises liability, and (2) whether a new-trial order can be reviewed on appeal from judgment in the second trial.

The principal issue in this discovery dispute is whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of documents in "native" or "near-native" format (with metadata) instead of static images, like Portable Document Format (PDF) or Tagged Image File Format (TIFF).

The principal issue in this discovery dispute is whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering production of documents in "native" or "near-native" format (with metadata) instead of static images, like Portable Document Format (PDF) or Tagged Image File Format (TIFF).

In this health care-liability case, alleging nurses should have prevented transfer of a patient who died on an acute pregnancy complication in an ambulance en route from a Harlingen hospital to one in Corpus Christi, the issues are (1) whether the Court has jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal; (2) whether the court of appeals applied the proper causation standard for expert medical reports; and (3) whether a nurse expert was properly qualified as an expert.

The principal issues in this merit-certificate challenge call for defining the expert's knowledge requirement, the expert's active engagement in the field in which the expert bases his opinion and the factual basis for the opinion. Two other principal issues are (1) whether the negligent-design lawsuit in this case must be dismissed if the certificate is not sufficient and, if so, (2) whether that dismissal must be with prejudice.

In this deed-interpretation case the issue is whether a floating non-participating royalty interest should burden remaining royalty interests proportionately.

In this declaratory action, to interpret a settlement's standard for cleaning groundwater contaminated by uranium mining, the principal issue is whether "surrounding circumstances" may be shown to help establish the agreement's baseline standard.

The issues are (1) whether deputy constables have collective-bargaining rights under Local Government Code chapter 174 and, if not, (2) whether a collective-bargaining agreement not authorized by the statute void and unenforceable.

A principal issue is whether the rule against perpetuities voids a non-participating royalty interest.

In this dog-bite case, by a military-contractor employee against another contractor that supplied bomb-sniffing dogs and its animal supplier, principal issues are (1) whether the trial court erred by designating the Army as a responsible third party (and, if not, whether the injury claims fall under the political-question doctrine); (2) whether the Federal Tort Claims Act's combatant-activities exception preempts the injury claims; (3) whether American K-9 has official immunity by delegation of a government function; (4) whether the trial court erred by denying the plaintiff Freeman her request to replead her claims; and (5) whether the appeals court erred by reversing dismissal of claims against Hill Country Dog Center, which supplied the dogs to American K-9.

The issues in this challenge to a tax-appraisal district's ownership determination bare (1) whether the district has authority to change who owns grain on the county's tax rolls: (2) whether the trial court erred by considering a fraud claim that was not presented to the appraisal board; and (3) whether sufficient evidence supported the trial court's fraud finding.

The principal issues are (1) whether Family Code section 42.003 apply to non-abduction cases and, if so, whether legally sufficient evidence supports liability against petitioners; (2) whether legally sufficient evidence supported recoverable damages under the Family Code; and (3) whether the court of appeals erred in upholding tort liability based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty.

The issues in this contract-breach and fraud case are (1) whether pleadings or evidence determine one indivisible injury existed and (2) whether the collateral-source rule bars credit for settlements paid by the defendant's insurer and the plaintiffs' former law firms.

The issues in this royalties-calculation dispute are (1) whether the producer's distribution of overriding royalties based on "amount realized" prohibits the producer from deducting post-production costs after delivery and (2) whether the merger-by-deed doctrine applies to govern the producer's obligation to an affiliate assigned overriding royalties by the original royalty-interest holder by superseding that assigning interest-holder's earlier agreements with the producer.

In this wrongful-termination case brought by an assistant district attorney, the issue is whether the district attorney's office is protected by immunity allegedly for firing the assistant prosecutor for notifying a defense attorney about exculpatory information the assistant discovered.

In this case alleging fraud underlying a contract the issues are (1) whether reliance is precluded because the alleged misrepresentations conflict with the contract; (2) whether the contract's merger clause disclaiming reliance precludes fraud; (3) whether evidence supports that each defendant had a disclosure duty or gave affirmative misrepresentations; (4) whether separate jury instructions should have been presented on each fraud theory; (5) whether the appeals court improperly sustained a spoliation instruction; and (6) whether the appeals court erred by remitting punitive damages, from $100 million to $600,000.

The principal issues in this defamation case are (1) whether "substantial truth" may be established as a common-law doctrine by accurately reporting third-party allegations and (2) whether the appeals court erred by finding a fact issue overrode summary judgment based on reviewing several articles together instead of individually.

In this dispute over nurses' pay - an allegation that under an implied contract they were salaried employees instead of paid hourly - the issues are (1) whether legally sufficient evidence supports the jury's finding the hospital agreed to pay them fixed, annual salaries and (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting the Fair Labor Standards Act's definitions of exempt and non-exempt positions.

The issues in this dispute over pricing an expanded easement is whether multiple emails establish an agreement satisfying the statute of frauds (1) if the emails are to different recipients containing futuristic language, (2) if the landowners identified as one lawyer's "clients" are enough to satisfy essential terms to identify the parties and (3) if the easement-location description properly identifies the property interest conveyed.

The issues are (1) whether the appeals court correctly interpreted the substantial-certainty test to determine that evidence showed an intentional injury; (2) whether the substantial-certainty test should be abandoned in favor of one to show "pure intent"; and, if not, (3) whether the plaintiffs presented enough evidence to establish a fact question under the substantial-certainty test.

In this defamation case by an upstart concrete-block manufacturer against its established competitor, the issues are (1) whether the suspect statements about a company's products are defamatory as a matter of law; (2) whether evidence legally establishes reputational harm; and (3) whether evidence legally supports the jury's damages award.

The issues in this electrocution-injury case are (1) whether Chapter 95, limiting a property owner's liability for a subcontractor's employees, applies only if a claim arises from the same improvement on which an injured subcontractor was working when the injury occurred; (2) whether the condition of the workplace or improvement is relevant to a Chapter 95 analysis; and (3) whether a property owner may be held liable based on a jury's finding of constructive, rather than actual, knowledge of an obvious condition.

In this dispute over ownership and minerals proceeds, among the issues are (1) whether a boundary stipulation is enforceable; (2) whether, if not enforceable, the stipulation was ratified; (3) whether Concho is a bad-faith trespasser if Ellison has superior title; and (4) whether more than one party can be a "payor" for oil-and-gas proceeds under Natural Resources Code sections 91.401(2) and 91.404.

The issues in this negligence and excessive-force case, based on the death of a state-hospital patient after his restraint, brought in part under Section 1983, are (1) whether the appeals court erred by holding the federal 1983 claim constitutes a health-care-liability claim requiring a threshold health-care expert report and (2) whether the federal law preempts the Texas Medical Liability Act's expert-report requirement.her families of the four injured teenagers the waived any challenge to the evidence by not contesting the jury's zero-damages finding; and (4) whether the appeals court applied the correct factual-sufficiency standard in reviewing the no-liability verdict.

In this class action, contesting an insurance company's refusal to renew all-risk homeowners' policies (HO-B coverage), the principal issue is whether the appeals court erred by holding the policyholders were entitled to renewal under their individual policies' stipulation that Farmers "may not refuse to renew . . . because of claims for losses resulting from natural causes."

In this mandamus petition from a dispute over a disallowed affidavit contesting medical expenses, the issues are (1) the trial court improperly struck the insurer's expert's counter-affidavit on medical expenses for lacking expertise and (2) whether mandamus relief is appropriate.

Principal issues in this underinsured-motorist claim are (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by compelling deposition of USAA corporate representatives before the injured driver got a judicial determination of preconditions establishing the insurer's liability and, if not, (2) whether the requested deposition topics are overly broad.

The issues in this insurance-coverage dispute - whether a "golf cart" is covered under an automobile-liability policy are (1) whether the appeals court's extrinsic-evidence exception to the eight-corners rule conflicts with the duty-to-defend jurisprudence; (2) assuming the appeals court's extrinsic-evidence exception is not categorically wrong, whether the court erred in resorting to extrinsic evidence in this case because the pleadings potentially implicated coverage; (3) whether the phrase "does not include mobile equipment" in the insurance policy's definition of "auto" is effectively a policy exclusion; and (4) whether the trial court erred by entering its amended final judgment without considering the one-satisfaction rule.

The issues are (1) whether consequential damages should be measured by a company's unrealized loss in value; (2) whether the consequential damages are reasonably foreseeable for Signature's loss in value and Signature's failed buyout negotiations; (3) whether evidence was legally enough to support the $2.4 million direct-damages award; (4) whether Signature was obligated to indemnify International Paper against claims made by Signature's owner, Ogden; and (5) whether Ogden may independently recover for contract breach under either a theory of assignment or agency.

At issue in this case is whether Texas Central qualifies as a "railroad company" or "interurban electric railway," and whether an entity must show reasonable probability of project completion to invoke eminent domain authority under Texas Rice Land Partners, LTD. v. Denbury Green Pipeline-Texas, LLC, 363 S.W.3d 192, 198, 202 (Tex. 2012). Texas Central intends to build, maintain, and operate a highspeed passenger railway between Houston and Dallas. Miles challenged Texas Central's eminent domain authority after the company attempted to survey Miles' property along the proposed route of the railway. Texas Central counterclaimed, seeking a declaratory judgment that the company was "railroad company" and "interurban electric railway" under the Texas Transportation Code. The trial court granted summary judgment for Miles. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Texas Central was "operating a railroad" and thus, a "railroad company" under the statute. Additionally, the court of appeals concluded that, because Texas Central was chartered for the purpose required under the Transportation Code, the company also qualified as an "interurban electric railway."

This suit involves the interpretation of a mineral lease and asks (1) whether the lease's offset production clause created a general duty to protect against all drainage, even when the allegedly draining well did not trigger the duty; (2) whether the court of appeals relied on an argument barred by res judicata; (3) whether there was a fact dispute about the existence of drainage; and (4) whether the court of appeals erred by reversing a summary judgment on unchallenged claims.

The principal issue in this case is whether the district court is required to submit questions on life expectancy and annual healthcare expenses to the jury under the Periodic Payment Statute. Ana Ramirez (Ramirez) went to Valley Regional Medical Center (Valley Regional) for premature labor with her son. Ramirez was primarily under the care of her nurses. Her obstetrician was on call. During her stay, the baby's heartbeat repeatedly dropped. Ramirez's obstetrician performed an emergency c-section. The umbilical cord was tightly wrapped around the baby's neck, cutting off oxygen. The baby was ultimately diagnosed with cerebral palsy.

This case, a dispute regarding the lease of a family ranch, raises four primary issues. First, does a person named in a trust agreement as a contingent beneficiary have standing under the Trust Code to bring claims against trustees? Second, does a co-trustee of a trust have standing to bring claims against non-co-trustee third parties? Third, does a co-trustee of a trust that owns a limited partnership share of a partnership have derivative standing to bring claims on behalf of the partnership? And fourth, is a co-trustee with arguable notice of other co-trustees' likely breach of fiduciary duty required to search public records for evidence of that breach?

At issue in this case is whether the parties' lease required Devon Energy to add postproduction costs incurred by third-party purchasers to the gross proceeds from sale before calculating Sheppard's royalty.

The issue in this case is, concerning the use of motor-driven equipment, whether negligent use or operation of a floodgate caused flooding damage to homeowners' properties.

The issue in this case is whether modifying an engineering plan without an engineer's statutorily required seal is a discretionary act for which the Texas Department of Transportation retains immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.

The principal issue in this case is whether individual homeowners are required to join all 700 of a community's other homeowners to secure a declaration that the homeowner's association cannot enforce restrictive covenants the association unilaterally amended to subject the plaintiffs to the association's enforcement authority.

The issue presented in this case is whether a governmental entity possesses immunity against another co-equal governmental entity's exercise of its eminent domain authority. If immunity exists, an additional question is whether the Legislature has waived that immunity by granting to the condemnor in the Water Code the power to condemn "any land."

At issue in this case is whether a statutory county court exercising jurisdiction pursuant to an independent, county-specific statute is subject to the same jurisdictional limitations as if the court were exercising its concurrent constitutional county court jurisdiction.

The issue in this case is whether the statute of limitations is equitably tolled for a plaintiff's subsequent suit after the court dismissed the plaintiff's earlier suit based on its failure to file a statutorily compliant expert certificate.

This case concerns the effect of a statutory provision requiring that certain insurance-coverage disputes be presided over by a judge appointed by the judicial panel on multidistrict litigation.